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Since the end of the Cold War, Western donors have been following a strategy of democracy 
promotion to Africa that involves giving assistance to both the state and the non-state actors 
including governments (as part of good governance program), parliaments, courts, political parties, 
civil society, electoral management bodies, election observation missions etc. The paper explores 
both the positive and the negative impacts of such assistance to African emerging democracies by 
using Ethiopia as a case study. The paper primarily deals with three sub-sectors of democracy 
promotion program: assistances to political parties, international election observation missions, 
and civil society. In this study, I argue that human rights and self interest (economic, political or 
both) shape the foreign aid policy of Western donors including democracy assistance. Moreover, 
the paper attempts to prove that democratic reversals or backsliding and human rights abuses in 
the recipient states can trigger aid reduction or termination only when the recipient states are 
neither economically nor strategically valuable to the Western donors. 
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Following WWII, the United States introduced the Marshal Plan and attempted to use economic 
aid to shape the politics of the recipient countries (European countries) whose economy was 
devastated by the war. During the Cold War, both the Western and the Eastern camps had used 
economic aid to buy allies that would increase their sphere of influences. In this period, Western 
donors followed such policy in Africa, Asia and Latin America with the aim of curbing the spread 
of Communism by allocating aid. Therefore, foreign aid had been politicized and its flow was 
largely to developing countries which had political and strategic importance to donor countries. As 
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Nielson and Nielson (2008) argued, from the beginning foreign aid by Western donors has been 
used to recruit political allies.  
 
The end of the Cold War in the 2nd half of the 1980s heralded a new era. This time, Western aid 
principally aimed at promoting democracy in emerging democracies. Democracy promotion as part 
of foreign aid1 (Ranker and Menocal 2007: 1) became a new approach based on the belief that 
democracies are more peaceful and better economic partners (Nielson and Nielson 2008). In this 
scheme, Western donors engaged themselves in providing aid for the promotion of democracy in 
emerging democracies (McMahon 2002).2 In the State of the Union Address in 1995, President Bill 
Clinton said “ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the 
advance of democracy elsewhere” (Steele and Scott 2005). According to Lundy (2004), the major 
ingredients of the American democracy support include free and fair elections, human rights 
protection, and the separation of the military from the executive branch of government. After the 
fall of Communism, respect for civil and political human rights has become the cornerstone of the 
democratization process in the emerging democracies and it has been one of the fundamental 
criteria to get aid from the Western established democracies. Since the first half of 1990s, donor 
countries of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) also decided 
good governance including human rights as a guide to their foreign aid allocation. Earlier, i.e. 
during the Cold War, good governance and human rights were given less consideration in aid 
allocations.  
 
According to Siegle (2007: 5), democracy promotion aid has grown twenty-fold since 1990. In the 
last decade, Western donors have dramatically increased the amount of aid for democracy 
promotion and the largest democracy assistance provider (in a country level) was the United States. 
The USAID budgeted $637 million for democracy assistance in fiscal year 1999 of which $123 
million was for Sub-Saharan Africa (Carothers 1999: 49, 51). In 2000, the US funding on 
democracy was 800 million dollars and it reached 1.4 billion dollars in 2005 (Mathieson and Young 
2006: 1). At the turn of the millennium it is estimated that roughly $ 2 billion per year was allocated 
for democracy promotion around the world. At present, the European Union offers over $1 billion 
and the United States annually provides around $850 million for democracy promotion.3 From 
European countries, the largest provider is Germany4 (Carothers 2004: 2; Youngs 2006). In 2004, 
Germany provided 200 million Euros (Ranker and Menocal 2007: 1). The major recipient of 
European democracy funding is Sub-Saharan Africa (Youngs 2008b 162). Africa received 40% of 
Danish political aid between 2000 and 2006 (Young 2008b:163). In 2004, Francophone African 
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countries received 86% of French governance aid. Africa also received 121 million euros from 
Sweden (i.e. democratic governance and human rights assistance) in 2007 (Youngs 2008b:163-164). 
 
Though, most of the time, direct democracy aid is funded bilaterally, international financial 
institutions like the World Bank, and the IMF also fund projects intended to promote good 
governance despite their charters that require them to be politically neutral.  
The paper attempts to address the following core questions: 
(a) Did democracy assistance bring the required change in Africa?  
(b) Why do Western donors continue their support to the TPLF-EPRDF government of Ethiopia 
despite its very bad human rights records and its role in hindering the country’s democratization 
process? 
(c) How does the Ethiopian government use the anti-terrorism campaigns as a cover to persecute 
its local opponents? 
 
2. Sub-Sectors of Democracy Assistance 
Western donors’ democracy aid to African transitional democracies has many sub-sectors. The 
major ones include assistance to political parties, electoral management bodies (i.e. for the training 
of election administrators), local election observers (e.g. election–related training), international 
election monitors, and civil society (i.e. support to NGOs/CSOs, media and labor unions, business 
associations, women organizations, civic education groups etc.) (de Zeeuv 2004: 6; Rakner and 
Menocal 2007). The major forms of democracy assistance include elections and electoral processes 
(i.e. support and advice on electoral systems, laws and regulations, assistance to establish legal 
electoral frameworks, support for electoral procedures such as party and voter registration, 
balloting, vote counting and dispute resolution), and judicial reform support. In the following 
sections, I will deal with Western donors’ democracy assistance to political parties, international 
election observation missions, and civil society in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. 
 
2.1. Democracy Assistance to Political Parties 
For Caton (2007: 6), party assistance is “any type of international assistance geared towards individual parties 
or the party system as a whole, with the purpose of strengthening democracy in a given country.” Political party 
assistance may include supporting parties to build or strengthen basic party organization in the 
areas of membership, grassroots outreach, developing political platforms, building internal 
democracy and gender diversity; assisting parties to increase capacity and encouraging them in 
electoral campaigning, voter mobilization, candidate selection and training, fundraising and media 
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work, promoting inter-party dialogue and cooperation at both the regional and the national levels; 
encouraging stronger linkages between political parties and civil society, financial support etc.  
 
Election campaigns in Africa are very expensive due to the low income of many Africans, high 
illiteracy rate, low technological development, large rural population (usually living in sporadic 
villages), low level infrastructure such as poor roads, archaic telecommunications and transport. All 
these factors add heavy burden on political parties (Saffu 2003: 2). Especially, the extreme poverty 
in Africa has put many political parties in a very serious situation threatening their chance of 
receiving sufficient contributions (donations) from local supporters. In developed democracies, 
public funding may be sufficient to cover all the expense of political parties. However, in African 
emerging democracies, public funding is either non-existent or meager. As the result, political 
parties are compelled to look for funds from other sources including party assistance from donor 
countries (Tshitereke 2002). In addition, the high cost of elections and their ambition to have high 
quality elections made Sub-Saharan African emerging democracies to be donor dependent (Rakner 
and Svasand 2002: 9).  
 
When we examine the role of donor countries in democratizing Africa, it is obvious that there is a 
shift in the donors’ behavior from the previous non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries to that of support for democracy and human rights. The major emphasis of donor 
countries in the African democratization process rests on the elections. In the early years of 
Western democracy aid to Africa, there were attempts to give direct financial donations to African 
political parties. However, soon, controversies erupted and still now there are problems for political 
parties receiving foreign aid. In some African countries, there are laws and regulations to control 
political parties’ fund raising because it is believed that the absence of such regulations might lead 
political parties to be controlled by foreign donors. It is true, some times, foreign funding might be 
counter-productive. In the past, there were many allegations against opposition parties by the 
incumbents due to foreign funding and how the funding was used. There were also many attempts 
to portray opposition parties as tools of foreign governments. Therefore, for African political 
parties foreign funding could be disadvantageous and sometimes might have disastrous effects 
(Wondwosen 2009e: 119-132).  
 
As I stated above, in many African countries, foreign funding is usually prohibited due to its risk to 
their national security. According to Pinto-Duschinsky (2002: 74), almost half of the 104 countries 
he studied have regulations that ban foreign donations. It is feared that through donations foreign 
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countries and organizations might influence the recipient countries’ domestic policies. Moreover, 
foreign influences through donations (particularly from those foreign elements that do not have 
voting rights) are not allowed. According to Amundsen (2007: 5), Western donors’ support to 
political parties could bring negative outcomes, namely, intervention problems, increasing 
fragmentation of political parties and polarization among parties, and so on.  
 
Realizing these risks foreign donors are no more willing to give direct assistance to African political 
parties. Instead, they have decided to give their assistance indirectly.5 Indirect assistance includes: 
building the capacity of electoral management bodies (i.e. by offering technical support, seminar, 
training, travel grants, material and financial support with the goal of improving conditions to hold 
“free and fair election”), sending international election observers (see Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137), 
supporting civil society (Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95), etc. According to Boneo and Dahl (2006: 20), 
indirect support given by Western donors has “fundamental importance for the countries where political 
parties cannot attract substantial funding.”  
 
To sum up, for opposition political parties in Africa receiving a financial support from Western 
donors has the following disadvantages: First and foremost, in emerging democracies foreign 
funding is viewed as an attempt by external forces to influence the outcome of national elections 
and the directions of political parties. In this case, foreign funding is regarded as something that 
violates the basic principle of democracy, i.e., “The election of representatives should express the political 
preferences of the politically enfranchised citizens” (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 18).  
 
Second, political parties’ dependence on external funding6 might limit or decrease their attachment 
with the electorate. In other words, political parties’ connection with the electorate would be less as 
long as political parties depend on foreign aid (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 18). When political 
parties’ connection with the electorate decreases, they no longer reflect the view of the electorate 
because party leaders start to live comfortable life thanks to the foreign aid.  
 
Third, party leaders could be turned into authoritarian7 practices and might follow a monolithic 
leadership. Furthermore, they could be less and less tolerant to criticisms from fellow party 
members fearing the exposure of their corrupt practices.  
 
Fourth, foreign funding might also lead to the formation of the so-called “party entrepreneurs”— 
individuals who establish political parties to tap internationally available funds (Mathisen and 
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Svasand 2002: 18). Therefore, many ambitious individuals would be encouraged to establish 
political parties as a short cut for rapid personal wealth. This condition could lead to further 
fragmentation of political parties —a development hardly conducive to democratic consolidation.  
 
Though, as we have seen above, many observers have criticized foreign funding as both unethical 
and counterproductive, there are also arguments that have supported foreign funding to political 
parties. According to the advocates of this argument, foreign funding for opposition parties is 
necessary to counter the domination of the incumbents. Moreover, though ideally political parties 
should develop and depend on local resources, the absolute poverty in Africa does not allow 
political parties to entirely depend on national resources (Wondwosen 2009e:119-132). After 
considering both sides of the arguments we can say that if democracy is to be entrenched in Africa 
(in principle) it needs to be strengthened from with in. Foreign funding might be necessary, but it 
should not be tainted and should not try to impose models from outside. Moreover, it has to 
support the national processes (Mathisen and Svasand 2002: 21). As recommended by Amundsen 
(2007: 7-8), instead of giving direct financial support to political parties Western donors should give 
democracy aid indirectly to assist reforms in constitutional and legal frameworks, electoral 
commissions, election observation missions (both local and international), parliaments, local 
governments, media, and civil society. 
 
2.1.1. Party Assistance Models of Western Donors 
According to Mathisen and Svasand (2002), there are five major Western donor countries that offer 
support to political parties in emerging democracies. These are Germany, the United States, Britain, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
(A) Germany 
Various foundations which are associated with German political parties offer political assistance to 
developing countries (Hearn 1999: 10; Mathisen and Svasand 2002). These are: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung (FES), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), Hanns-
Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), and Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (HBS).8 These Stiftungs (foundations) originally 
were aimed at providing civic education to the German people. Later on, however, they started to 
expand their activities abroad. These foundations get funds for their international activities from 
the German government, and they have full independence in the allocation of the funds. At 
present, the foundations conduct their activities in more than hundred countries and the biggest 
recipient African country is South Africa. For instance, the Konrad Adenauer foundation used to 
support the Inkatha party of South Africa since the 1980s, while the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
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supported the ANC. On the other hand, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation supported the liberal 
community, and organizations like the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) and the 
Helen Suzman Foundation. The other recipient African country was Uganda. Both Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Foundation had been supporting Uganda since 1987. 
The Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) received support from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
while the Democratic Party (DP) of Uganda received support from the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation (Hearn 1999: 10). In their activities in developing countries, which had been going on 
for three or more decades, these German foundations were criticized for their co-operation with 
authoritarian and single party regimes. Therefore, due to these constant criticisms the foundations 
stopped supporting political parties in developing countries, but increased their support to civic 
societies, advocacy groups, media, political think tanks, parliaments, and electoral management 
bodies (Mathisen and Svasand 2002).  
 
(B) The United States 
The American support for new democracies is conducted largely by two organizations: the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) (Carlson n.d: 1-20; 
Carothers 2004: 14-15). Both NDI and IRI are getting fund from the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), and the USAID (USAID 1999). In comparison, the NDI works more broadly 
than the IRI that works only in few countries that are strategically important to the U.S national 
foreign policy interests (USAID 1999: 17). When we compare both the NDI and the IRI with 
German Stiftungs, we find out that both American organizations are less autonomous than their 
German counterparts, and their programs are always expected to adhere to the US government’s 
guidelines. The two American foundations support and conduct projects on elections, civic 
education, parliaments, and political party capacity buildings. Their support to political parties in 
capacity building usually includes the training of party MPs, technical assistance for party building 
and election-related issues etc (Mathisen and Svasand 2002). The two American organizations 
sometimes are accused of being interventionist and partisan. For instance, Ethiopia expelled the 
NDI and IRI, and another American organization, IFES9, from the country in the 2005 
Parliamentary election. The Ethiopian government told the organizations to leave the country with 
in 48 hours due to their “failure to register” properly (Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137).10  
 
(C) Britain 
Since 1992, the UK Westminster Foundation (WF) has been supporting the building of pluralistic 
democratic institutions overseas. The foundation has been active in East and Central Europe and in 
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Anglophone African countries. The foundation is not affiliated with any particular party and it 
attempts to have a neutral role in the democracy promotion assistance. It gives technical assistance 
to electoral processes, supports the independent media, trade unions, political NGOs, parliaments 
and political parties. The foundation gets its fund from the British government (Mathisen and 
Svasand 2002). According to Mathisen and Svasand (2002), British political parties also offer 
technical and budget support to political parties in developing countries. The technical assistance 
involves training, election campaigning, party management, and support for think-tanks while the 
budgetary assistance involves the funding of party capacity building activities. 
 
(D) The Netherlands 
The Dutch foundation for the new South Africa (NZA) was established to assist post-apartheid 
South Africa’s stability. The foundation was supported by all Dutch political parties in the 
parliament, except the extreme right party. In 2000, NZA was replaced by the Netherlands Institute 
for Multi-party Democracy (IMD). The new foundation is attempting to expand its activity in Latin 
America and Asia, and in few African countries such as Mozambique (Mathisen and Svasand 2002). 
 
(E) Sweden 
Seven Swedish foundations closely aligned with Swedish political parties have started to support 
“sister parties” in developing countries, and East and Central Europe since 1995 (SIDA 2002: 11). 
Their aim is to develop pluralistic party systems in the new democracies (Mathisen and Svasand 
2002). Their support includes both technical and budgetary assistances to political parties. African 
countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia have been the beneficiaries of such support 
(SIDA 2002: 12). 
 
2.1.2. Democracy Assistance to Ethiopian Political Parties during the 2005 Election 
In the 2005 election, as part of democracy assistance programs, Western donors offered 
financial/material assistance to Ethiopian political parties that participated in the election. In this 
election, many opposition parties, the incumbent party, and independent candidates received 
indirect funding (i.e. non-cash support in goods and services) for their election campaigns from the 
international donors. The coordinator of this funding program was the Electoral Reform 
International Services (ERIS). ERIS11 received the fund from the international donors through the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to the cash-value allocation formula, 
every political party/coalition received 3,460 Birr per candidate (i.e. a maximum of 259,000 Birr for 
75 candidates). Furthermore, each political party or coalition that contested in two or more regions 
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(with more than one candidate in each region) received a cash-value allocation of 43,250 Birr per 
region it contested. In order to encourage the participation of women, each political party or 
coalition fielding a woman candidate received a cash value allocation of 2,160 Birr (250 USD) per 
woman candidate. Each independent candidate received a cash-value allocation of 3,460 Birr for 
printing services. In general, in the 2005 election, each political party was entitled to receive a 
maximum of 30, 000 USD (i.e. 400USD for a single candidate) in the federal election.12 ERIS also 
supplied additional 5000 USD (for each region) for political parties contesting in two or more 
regions. All in all, ERIS offered 515,150 USD to political parties and independent candidates in the 
May 2005 election: the EPRDF received USD 88,750 (17%), CUD 71,000 USD13 (14%), UEDF 
(United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) 47,500 USD (9%); OFDM (Oromo Federalist Democratic 
Movement) 34,150 USD (7%), independents 141, 200 USD (27%), and other small parties 132, 300 
USD (26%).14 Furthermore, in the election of the Somali region, which was held separately due to 
security reasons, ERIS distributed material assistance to the Somali People’s Democratic Party 
(SPDP), the Western Somali Democratic Party (WSDP), the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
(CUD), the Dil Wabi People’s Democratic Movement (DWPDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance 
Force (SDAF), and the All Ethiopian National Movement (AENM) (The Ethiopian Herald 26 July 
2005; 18 August 2005)15.  
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Table-1: Support to Political Parties, Coalitions and Independent Candidates in the 2005 
Federal and Regional Elections 
 
 





Name of Recipient Political Party/Coalition 
Total Cash-Value 
Allocation (ETB) 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 767,685 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) 614,150 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) 410,875 
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) 295,400 
All Ethiopian Democratic Party 192,460 
Geda System Advancement Party 151,375 
Sheko and Mezenger People’s Democratic Unity Organization 129,315 
Oromia Liberation National Party 121,100 
Tigri Worgi Nationality Democratic Unity Party 73,100 
Sidama Liberation Movement 67,900 
Sidama Hadicho People’s Democratic Organization 67,900 
Ethiopian Pan Africanist Party 61,845 
Oromo Liberation Unity Front 52,765 
Oromo Abbo Liberation Front 38,060 
Wolayata People’s Democratic Front 32,000 
Afar National Democratic Party 29,840 
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front 29,840 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Unity Front 24,220 
Gambela People’s Democratic Movement 10,380 
Ethiopian National Unity Party 10,380 
Afar Liberation Front Party 6,920 
Denta, Debamo, Kitchenchla Democratic Organization 6,920 
Unity of Southern Ethiopia Democratic Forces 6,920 
Harari People Democratic Party 6,920 
Gamo Democratic Union 6,920 
Argoba Nationality Democratic Organization 6,920 
Argoba People’s Democratic Movement 3,460 
Ethiopian Social Democratic Movement 3,460 
Gedeo People’s Democratic Organization 3,460 
Somali Peoples’ Democratic Party 3,460 
Hareri National League 3,460 
Ethiopians’ Unity Democratic Organization 3,460 
Total 3,242,870 
Source: NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia) 
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2.2. Democracy Assistance to Election Observation Missions 
One of the sub-sectors of Western donor’s democracy promotion aid to emerging democracies is 
the support given to election observers (local and international). In 2005, for instance, electoral 
observation accounted for 12 % of the EU funding. In the same year, EU election observation 
missions were sent to Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Guinea 
Bissau, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Venezuela (Kausch et al 2006: 67). Most of the time, the presence of 
international election observers serves as a “green light” for opposition parties to participate in the 
election with the hope that the election will be free and fair16 (Hyde and Beaulieu 2004: 5). 
According to the UN (2005: 1), international election observation conveys the interests of the 
international community for the rule of law, respect of human rights, and for the general 
achievement of democratic elections. In principle, international election monitors should be free 
from any of multilateral and bilateral considerations that compromise their neutrality, and have to 
concentrate in the civil and political rights. In practice, however, international election observers’ 
analysis of an election is influenced by the objectives of the observing government or organization, 
and the particular goal of the election. International election monitors examine human rights and 
the general political situation very closely in countries that are in the early stage of building a 
democratic system than in the countries that have completed the transition stage of building 
democracy (IDEA 1999: 4). However, some times, as Geisler (1993) notes, cited by Brown (2005: 
186), “Expecting little of African democracies...., donors express satisfaction with elections that are clearly not ‘free 
and fair’”. Moreover, as Brown (2005: 186) indicates, “Often, bilateral donors knowingly endorse severely 
flawed elections and even prevent measures that will lay the foundation for future democratization”.17 
 
In Ethiopia, during the reign of Haile Selassie (1930-1974) and the Derg administration (1974-1991) 
international election monitors were not allowed (Dessalegn and Mehret 2004, 27). After the 
coming to power of the TPLF-EPRDF international election observers were allowed to observe 
elections in the country. In the June 21, 1992 regional and Woreda elections, by the invitation of the 
National Election Commission (NEC) more than 200 international observers from 23 countries 
came to Ethiopia for the first time to observe the election (NDIA and AAI 1992). For instance, the 
African-American Institute (AAI), a private voluntary organization, sponsored more than 70 
observers out of more than 200 members of the JIOG (Joint International Observer Group). In 
the 2000 parliamentary election, the Ethiopian government refused to allow international observers 
to monitor the election. This action had brought strong local and international criticisms against the 
ruling party (TPLF-EPRDF) (Reuters 02 May 2005).  
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In the 2005 election, however, the government decided to invite international observers after 
hesitating for some time. To facilitate the monitoring process, the NEBE (National Election Board 
of Ethiopia) formulated a Code of Conduct for the international election observers.18 According to 
the Code of Conduct (issued on February 25, 2005), the international election observers got the 
right to access election officials at all levels; observe polling and counting stations and venues; 
participate in the meetings called by the NEBE Secretariat in relation to election; attend election 
campaign rallies of political parties; and report any election-related irregularities to the election 
observers (at the polling stations and counting venues), and to the NEBE. The obligations of the 
international election observers, according to the Code of Conduct include: (a) Respecting the 
country’s sovereignty, the national laws and regulations, and the cultures of the people (b) Follow 
lawful instructions of the elections officers and security personnel (c) Never giving instructions, and 
show respect and courtesy to elections officers (d) Being impartial and not showing or wearing any 
partisan symbols and banners (e) Not carry weapon (NEBE 25 February 2005). 
 
The major international election monitors in the 2005 parliamentary election in Ethiopia were the 
Carter Center, the European Union, and the African Union. As Pereira (2006:ii) pointed out, the 
conclusions of the election reports of the EU-EOM (European Union Election Observation 
Mission), and the Carter Center in the 2005 election concerning the validity of the electoral process 
were totally different from each other. The major cause for this discrepancy was their difference in 
the conceptualization of “free and fair” electoral practices. At present, there is an intense debate 
regarding “one voice” versus “pluralism” or “harmonization” of election monitoring reports and 
activities. Some scholars argue for “once voice” concept indicating that if various groups of 
international election monitors coordinate their activities and speak with one voice, electoral 
autocrats will not get a chance to cover their electoral manipulation. This is because, as observed in 
many elections in various countries, electoral autocrats cleverly exploit the differences among the 
election reports of the international election observers. Therefore, if the election monitors speak 
with a unified voice, it will deprive the electoral autocrats of “the ability to point to differing 
characterizations of an election by international monitors” (Merloe1999). On the other hand, however, 
forcing all international election monitors to issue similar election statements has its own 
shortcomings: First of all, this attempt might encourage the incumbents to invite only friendly 
monitors in order to ensure positive statements. Second, in the process, international monitors 
from NGOs might be overshadowed by big regional organizations and their voices might be 
silenced (Merloe 1999). Therefore, the release of international monitors’ election reports sometimes 
with diverse contents should not be considered as a weakness. To sum up, as asserted by Merloe 
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(1999), “No delegation or organization .....should accept the proposition-sometimes advanced by countries holding an 
election-that there is to be only one officially accredited delegation for an election or that one, unified statement must be 
issued on behalf of all international election observers.”  
 
2.3. Democracy Assistance to Civil Society 
Many scholars (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Jenkins 2001; Howell and Pearce 2001; Foley and 
Edwards 1996; Van Rooy 1998) have examined and debated the impacts of democracy promotion 
aid to civil society. Democracy promotion assistance to civil society may involve various forms: 
capacity-building assistance; and grants channeled through in-country missions or intermediaries 
(i.e. international NGOs, political foundations, churches, trade unions etc.) for advocacy work, 
projects, organizational development, research documentation, trainings, and workshops. The 
growing obstacles to Western democracy assistance to civil society at present include “the emergence of 
semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes characterized by superficially democratic process that disguise and help legitimate 
authoritarian rule” (NED 2006: 2) and recipient governments’ hostile policies such as introducing 
legal constraints on NGOs, conducting extra-legal forms of harassment on stakeholders etc. (NED 
2006: 2). Dictatorial governments have been trying to hamper democracy aid to NGOs by taking 
measures such as putting restrictions on foreign funding19 and domestic financing, impediments to 
registration and denial of legal status etc. (NED 2006). Alarmed by the “color revolutions” which 
were largely facilitated by civil society organizations in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, authoritarian 
governments and electoral autocrats have tightened controls on the international NGOs.20 They 
have also upgraded censorship techniques on the NGOs by adopting the Chinese latest internet 
monitoring and control technology (NED 2006: 7).21 
 
As I have already discussed, due to civil society’s potential role in democratizing Africa, Western 
donors have shifted their emphasis from political parties to civil society organizations (Robinson 
and Friedman 2005:1). This shift is due to the fact that elections have become very controversial in 
Sub-Saharan Africa; and the involvement of Western donors in the elections by funding political 
institutions has provoked the recipient governments. Civil society groups that are mostly selected 
for Western democracy aid are advocacy NGOs such as human rights groups and election 
monitoring organizations (Carothers 1997: 114; Hearn 1999: 2). According to Robinson and 
Friedman (2005: 1), the most favored recipient civil society organizations by the donor countries22 
are the ones that are involved in activities “designed to increase government accountability, broaden 
participation in public life and influence state policy”.  Dessalegn (2002: 103) argues that the donor 
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community encourages and strengthens voluntary institutions “in the belief that the road to democracy in 
Africa lies not in revolutions and class struggle but in the active involvement of civil society in the political process”.  
 
The relationships between the state and civil society in developing countries are very complex than 
the situation in industrial counties (Ottaway 2005: 130). In developing countries, “Many governments 
see civil society organizations as dangerous enemies to be tightly controlled” (Ottaway 2005: 131). At present, 
many Western governments and foundations are increasingly “channeling funds for service provision, 
development projects, and humanitarian relief through NGOs” (Florini 2000). The preference given by 
Western donor countries to the CSOs/NGOs in the distribution and allocation of financial and 
material aids rather than the governments23 has created resentment among governments in 
developing countries (see Carapico 2002; Carothers and Ottaway 2000). As Clayton et al (2000:2) 
noted, when the Cold War ended, Western donors started to enforce good governance in 
developing countries by attaching certain preconditions in return for economic aid: the respect of 
human rights, the conduct of multi-party elections, and the reformation of state bureaucracies. The 
flourishing of civil society organizations in the 1990s was very important in the realization of this 
plan. According to TI Source Book (2000: 129), in the past, under the guise of state sovereignty 
power was monopolized by the states. At present, that authority is in decline and power is also 
claimed by civil society and the globalized business. Therefore, “Civil society is frequently challenging the 
governments’ legitimacy to speak on behalf of the people, and is frequently being used to channel development aid in 
ways that by-pass their officials” (TI Source Book 2000: 129). 
 
Since 1990s, Western governments’ interest in funding civil society organizations in Africa has 
highly increased, and to a certain extent this assistance has bolstered the continent’s 
democratization process24 (Hearn 1999: 2). Though, in principle, as Chazan (1992: 282) notes, “The 
nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated abuses of state power, 
holding rulers accountable to their citizens and establishing the foundations of durable democracy” (cited by Okuku 
2002: 83), the current picture in many African countries is not encouraging. Civil society groups in 
Africa have many weaknesses that limited their participation in the democratization process. First, 
they lack internal democracy, i.e. their own members are not socialized with democratic principles 
let alone democratizing the government. Second, they are heavily dependent on foreign donors25 
and this factor has given African repressive governments a pretext to label them as agents of 
foreign governments. This dependence also has forced them to be disassociated from the local 
conditions and the local people. In the worst cases, they are found attempting to establish the local 
CSOs/NGOs as replicas of the CSOs/NGOs of the donor countries26 (DPMF December 2002: 
 
Teshome, W. (2013). Democracy promotion and Western aid to Africa: Lessons from Ethiopia (1991-2012). International 




22-29; Thomson 2006: 280). Moreover, their geographical penetration is heavily tilted to the urban 
areas. In order to correct these weaknesses, DPMF (December 2002: 22) has proposed the 
following recommendations: First, CSOs in Africa have to formulate projects relevant to the local 
conditions and not necessarily to those of donors. Second, they have to mobilize funds from local 
sources to curtail their dependence on foreign donors.27 Third, they have to establish or increase 
their networks with sisterly organizations at the national, sub-regional, and international levels. 




At the end of the Cold War, many Western democracies vigorously started democracy promotion 
aid to developing countries. According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), the end of the Cold 
War in Africa was accompanied by mass protests for democratization that became acute from 1988 
to 1994. In this period, in various African countries including Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Eritrea, ethnic wars, internal revolts, and guerrilla movements overthrew oppressive governments. 
The despots of the Cold War period were replaced by young guerrilla fighters who made many 
promises for democratization. There were also many hopes on the so-called “a new generation” of 
leaders in Africa in the 1990s (Wachter 14 February 2007), particularly on Paul Kagame of Rwanda; 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea. 
 
These so-called “new generation” of African statesmen were flooded with international economic 
and political aid. “But to the disappointment of many, this new guard” started “to adopt some of the undemocratic 
behavior of the dictators it replaced” (Sanders 2006). In the 2005 Ethiopian election, Meles Zenawi 
brutally suppressed the election-related riots and massacred many people.  
 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda went even to the extent of re-writing the Constitution so that he could 
get a chance to run for a third presidential term. In his speech in 2002, Museveni said, “We are people 
in suits by day but in uniform at night. We fought a liberation war....Don’t play around with freedom fighters” 
(McLaughlin 07 November 2005). As Patric Smith, editor of the African Confidential said, in 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda “clearly, all has gone very badly.” According to him, “These were the people 
that everyone was raving about,” but now “there’s a reversion to the same old instincts” (Sanders 20 February 
2006). The recent events in those countries have forced the Africans “to look to yet another 
generation” (Harman 30 September 2003). The multi-party democracy that started in the first half 
of 1990s in Africa has clearly gone wrong.  
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Though Western donors were supposed to apply strong pressure on these African leaders for more 
democratization, so far, they have failed to do so. Countries like Ethiopia and Uganda receive half 
of their budgets from Western donors. Due to various reasons, however, the donor countries are 
not willing to push them too hard. As a certain observer remarked, “After touting these leaders as 
paragons, and investing billions in them, ‘the West doesn’t want to say, ‘we failed’” (McLaughlin 07 November 
2005). Therefore, in contemporary Africa, as Van Hüllen and Stahn (2007) said, “Semi-authoritarian 
states indeed are the greatest challenge to the planning and implementation of external democracy promotion”. 
 
At present, there is an intense debate on the workability of foreign aid and democracy assistance. 
Some scholars argue that foreign aid retards democratization by increasing the life span of 
dictatorial regimes.29 For instance, Djankov et al (2006), and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) note 
that Western aid strengthens non-democratic regimes.30 Many scholars cite the case of Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Eritrea as examples to prove the failure of foreign aid and democracy 
assistance31. For authors like Knack (2004) the effects of Western aid on the democratization 
process in the recipient countries are insignificant, while Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2008), and 
Djankov et al (2006) argue that the effects are totally negative. “The general consensus,” says Siegle 
(2007:6), “Is that aid has only a marginal effect on democratic progress”. This is because, in order to make the 
democratic change effective, there has to be a political will for reform in the receiving countries 
(Carothers 1999). As Remmer (1995) argues, domestic factors in the receiving countries (e.g. the 
political leadership) are very crucial for democratic outcomes. Moreover, according to Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1997), and Goldsmith (2001), the combined effects of democracy assistance and 
domestic pressure such as popular protests can bring the desired result in Africa. Many scholars 
also argue that foreign aid32 (including democracy assistance) is necessary, and to make it effective 
the donors should follow “aid conditionality.” Diamond (1997: IVXXX) insists for applying 
international pressure for democracy and “the increasing emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion 
in the foreign policies of established democracies, especially the United States”. 
 
3.1. Aid Conditionality 
Aid conditionality is “the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually 
terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the recipient”33 (Stokke 1995: 12). According to 
Clinkenbeard (2002: 12), aid conditionality became the principal policy of the donors since the end 
of the Cold War. However, due to various reasons this policy is still not properly applied.34 In Sub-
Saharan Africa, this failure was due to the result of two important factors: structural impediments 
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that limit the effectiveness of the donors, and the lack of donors’ commitment and follow-ups, 
particularly when foreign policy interests intervene (Brown 2005: 80). 
 
The US has lost the credibility35 of being the principal promoter of democratic values due to 
President Bush’s policy of creating counter terrorism alliance with brutal dictators like Meles 
Zenawi of Ethiopia and Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and its attempt to democratize countries 
such as Iraq by force (Carothers 2009:4-5).36According to Carothers (2007: V), democracy 
promotion of the Unites States under George W. Bush was widely discredited due to its close 
association with the Iraq war. Under the Bush administration, “The spread of democracy has stagnated in 
the rest of the world, with democratic reversals or backsliding outweighing gains” (Carothers 2007: V). 
 
Youngs (2008a: 1) argues that the  leadership loss of the United States concerning democracy 
promotion has enhanced the role of the European Union as a global leader in supporting political 
liberalization in autocratic states. EU’s democracy strategy has been based on three pillars: “the use 
of positive incentives to stimulate reform”, “the selective use of punitive measure and diplomatic 
pressure”, “and the funding of democracy programmes” (Youngs 2008a: 1). In general, European 
countries have been following a policy of incentives for political reform. In Africa, many countries 
have been rewarded with additional aid and economic cooperation by European countries for their 
commitment to democratic reform. This measure of the European Union is based on its policy of 
cooperative rather than a coercive approach to democracy promotion (Youngs 2008a: 2-5). For 
instance, Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands increased aid to Kenya after Daniel Arab 
Moi lost the election in 2002. Sierra Leone received 200 million Euro aid package from the UK for 
2004-2007 following the 2002 elections (Young 2008a: 2-5).  
 
However, as Young (2008a: 2) notes, many European governments do not have consistent strategy 
for democracy promotion, and they lack effective and clear vision on the relationship between 
democratization and other political objectives. For instance, European countries supplied Nigeria 
with a debt relief package worth over 5 billion Euros despite evidence of deterioration in its 
democratic processes. The UK remains committed to allocating resources principally with the goal 
of poverty reduction, not in response to political changes (Young 2008a: 4). Spain also increased its 
aid to Angola despite political repression in the country (Young 2008a: 4). The TPLF-EPRDF 
government of Ethiopia was also rewarded with aid allocations of over 50 million Euros annually 
from the EU, Italy, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany despite the government’s 
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increased repression against opposition figures (Young 2008a: 5). According to Youngs (2008a 2-5), 
“The overall correlation between European aid and recipients’ democratic quality remains low in Africa”. 
 
It is true since 2000 European countries have used Article 96 of the Cotonou accord to impose 
sanctions on some African countries like Ivory Coast, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Central African 
Republic, Guinea Bissau, Togo, the Republic of Guinea and Mauritania. However, these sanctions 
were conflict rather than democracy-related (Youngs 2008a: 7). European donors used aid 
conditionality only in very few cases as temporary measures. For instance, the Dutch and the UK 
reduced direct budget support to Uganda in 2006 when Museveni hesitated to usher in multiparty 
politics, and re-channeled assistance to relief efforts in northern Uganda. In Sierra Leone, the UK 
slightly reduced budget support in 2006 due to governance problem. In Ethiopia, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK suspended or cut back aid in 2005. The European Union Commission 
resumed full funding as soon as the Ethiopian government agreed to a non-committal dialogue 
with the Opposition (Youngs 2008a:8). Italy also increased aid to Ethiopia threefold in 2006 and 
“even much UK aid was in practice soon being spent in much the same way as before the elections” (Youngs 2008a: 
8). Moreover, “Many African governments quickly learned how to make the minimum necessary reforms to retain 
their levels of aid:  allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but 
not freely; allowing civic groups to function, but not effectively; and consenting that elections be held, but not replace the 
ruling party” 37(Brown 2005:184, citing Joseph 1997: 62, and Carothers 1997).  
 
As Brown (2005:186) notes, “Donors, ....... are not monolithic entities; intra-governmental disagreements 
sometimes result in work at cross-purposes, with one branch of government undermining another one’s efforts.” In the 
2005 Ethiopian election, for instance, while the American Congress strongly condemned Ethiopian 
government officials for human rights abuses, State Department officials followed a business-as-
usual approach (see Berhanu 1998EC: 422-423). This was also true with the EU (European Union). 
As observed in the 2005 election, while the EU parliament strongly and repeatedly denounced the 
Ethiopian government’s actions against opposition figures and their supporters, the EU 
Commission on the other hand continued its support to the EPRDF’s government38(see Berhanu 
1998EC: 422-423).  
 
Some scholars have criticized aid conditionality39. For instance, for Lawson (1999: 23), “Democracy 
promotion, like structural adjustment, will be another experiment on relatively powerless Africans by (perhaps well-
intentioned) international ‘mad scientists’”. Lawson (1999: 23) argued that “the creation of democratic 
institutions cannot be accomplished from outside”.40 Another scholar, Pinto-Duchhinsky (1997: 307), also 
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warned that “countries may be justified in mounting efforts to promote democracy abroad, but such projects need to 
be carried out with care”. Rakner and Menocal (2007: 4) also argue that when the donors offer 
democracy promotion to African countries they should realize that democratization should be 
driven from within and should not be imposed from outside. According to Rakner and Menocal 
(2007: 4), outside help is necessary but the local political, cultural and socio-economic conditions 
should be properly considered. Moreover, the democracy support should avoid dominance. For 
obvious reasons, many leaders in developing countries strongly oppose aid conditionality. For 
instance, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, “We believe democracy can not be imposed from outside in any 
society....To impose it from outside is inherently undemocratic. Each sovereign nation has to make its own decisions 
and have its own criteria as to how they govern themselves” (AFP 25 January 2008; The Guardian 25 January 
2008).  
 
On the other hand, many scholars including African scholars such as Moyo (2009) have strongly 
criticized Western donors for their failure to properly apply aid conditionality. Dambisa Moyo, in 
her most controversial book titled, “Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better 
Way Africa” (2009), (cited by Frot n.d.) said, “Aid conditionality has not helped to make politicians adopt 
growth-promoting policies. It relies on a flawed mechanism of non-credible threats. Despite the tough stance towards 
governments not complying with donor conditions, aid is usually disbursed regardless of broken promises.“ 
 
Barratt (2002) argues that in this era of globalization, recipient states’ human rights abuses would be 
the causes for aid reduction or cessation by donors only when the recipient country is not 
important economically and when its government is politically weak. To prove this, Baratt (2002) 
cites two cases where human rights were gravely violated during civil wars: Yugoslavia and Somalia. 
Relatively speaking, in the Kosovo crisis (Yugoslavia), the response of Western countries and the 
UN was very swift. On the other hand, in Somalia, more than two years had lapsed before the UN 
and Western countries decided to intervene. Similarly, in Rwanda, the international response to the 
genocide and other human rights violations was embarrassing. The fundamental question here is, 
“Why did the international community, particularly Western donors follow different criteria in the 
aforesaid countries?” We can say that in dealing with the emerging democracies, Western countries 
take human rights issues into consideration only occasionally due to various protracted reasons. 
Moreover, the rise of the neo-liberal approach that gives high importance to global trade for mutual 
benefit between nations (see Keohane 1993, Lipson 1993, Axelrod and Keohane 1993) compels 
Western donors to overlook human rights abuses in emerging democracies.41 
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Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a debate whether the major aim of Western donors’ 
economic aid to developing countries is altruistic or self-interest (Barratt 2002:8). Though, 
generally, Western donors’ support to emerging democracies is presented as an altruistic measure, it 
should be noted that they also obtain both material and non-material rewards. According to Owen 
(2002), powerful states that engage in the promotion of democracy get an opportunity to 
consolidate their power and influence, and the advancement of democracy is a strategic solution to 
their security problems. Moreover, as Meernik (1996) said, the consolidation of democracy in other 
countries decreases the possibility of conflict.  
 
As I have stated earlier, though Western donors’ policy towards Africa since 1991 has been the 
promotion of democracy, in practice, there were cases where they themselves became hindrances to 
the democratization process in the continent. In many instances, Western governments have sided 
with African electoral autocrats against the pro-democracy movements due to their own political, 
economic, security and military interests.42 In the post-1991 Africa, we have observed how Western 
donors cleverly saved pro-West dictatorial African governments from losing power in the elections. 
In Kenya, for instance, when the corrupt and pro-West dictator Daniel Arab Moi was at the brink 
of collapse due to the Opposition’s decision to boycott the election on three occasions between 
June 1992 and January 1993, the donors “played a role in quickly ending it without the Moi regime making 
more than minimal concessions” (Brown 2001: 731). According to Brown (2001:731), the donors 
pressured the Kenyan opposition to end the boycott. In the 1997 election, though the donors’ joint 
observation team calculated the opposition’s victory (i.e. 106-108 seats to KANU’s 102-104), “At 
the behest of Canada, France, the USA and especially the UK, donors deliberately suppressed evidence that KANU 
had not legitimately won a majority in parliament” (Brown 2001: 733-734). Moreover, in the 2008 Kenyan 
election, as Sisk (2008:18) notes, Kibaki who committed electoral fraud in the presidential poll and 
who ignited violence was rewarded by the international community (in the mediation effort by the 
US and Kofi Annan) by brokering power sharing deal to “prevent the further escalation of 
violence” and to stop the slide of Kenya into the group of the so-called “failed states”.  
 
The most embarrassing interference of Western donors in African elections was the one which was 
witnessed in the 2005 Ethiopian election43. During the post-election crises, Western donors 
supported Meles Zenawi’s government in spite of the fact that the ruling party had rigged the 
election (Dadge 19 May 2009). They supported the ruling party: (a) by putting pressure on the 
opposition parties to withdraw their pre-conditions in the June 10 Pact (Berhanu 1998EC: 401-404; 
Lidetu 1998EC: 92)44 (b) by forcing the opposition to recognize the authority of the NEBE, which 
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was pro-EPRDF (c) by compelling the opposition parties to accept the decision of the NEBE 
regarding the composition and the decision of the CRB (Complaints Review Board) (Berhanu 
1998EC: 388-389, 396-398; Lidetu 1998EC: 94-96) (d) by forcing the Opposition to accept the 
decision of the CIPs (Complaints Investigation Panels) (Berhanu 1998EC: 402-404; Lidetu 
1998EC:98-99), and (e) by defusing the three day stay-at-home strike that was declared by the 
opposition parties  (Lidetu 1998EC: 120-122)45 to kneel down the government. 
 
To sum up, despite “winning” the election,46 the Ethiopian opposition parties (i.e. CUD and 
UEDF) were neither allowed to form a government alone nor able to get a power-sharing deal due 
to their lack of effective and decisive leadership; the NEBE’s biased decision that favored the ruling 
party; the lack of independent courts; the absence of a neutral army and police; and Western 
donors’ unwavering support to the ruling party. In the 2005 post-election crises, Western donors 
brokered not a power-sharing47, but a complete capitulation of the opposition parties with the 
pretext of “stopping the further escalation of the electoral violence and the country’s slide into 
complete anarchy.” 
 
3.2. Democracy Promotion Assistance to Ethiopia (1991-2012) 
Between 1997 and 2003, the leading bilateral donors to Ethiopia (in order of levels of assistance) 
were the United States48, Japan, Italy, Germany, the UK, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden (USAID 2005). At present, the major multilateral donors that support Ethiopia are the 
World Bank, the EU, the UN Agencies, and the African Development Bank (USAID 2005). The 
leading donor in humanitarian assistance for Ethiopia is the US, followed by the EU and World 
Food Program (USAID 2005). In the Post-Derg Ethiopia, the United States development 
assistance (particularly in 1999-2001) was around USD 9.6 billion, and 30-50% of this total was 
relief and humanitarian aid. Democracy and governance assistance held only less than 5-10% of the 
total (Desalegn and Meheret 2004; de Zeeuv 2004: 6). 
 
The Dutch bilateral support to Ethiopia in 2005 was around 21 million Euros focusing mainly on 
food security, health care and education. Due to the 2005 election-related violence in Ethiopia, the 
Netherlands cut the share of its aid going to the federal Ethiopian government from 35% to 15% 
and increased support for good governance programs (Kausch et al 2006: 150). Disappointed by 
Meles Zenawi′s  handling of the post election crisis, Sweden49 also froze direct budgetary support to 
Ethiopia (Kausch et al 2006: 195) and the UK50 suspended the planned 30 million Euro aid increase 
to Ethiopia. To be more precise, Britain did not suspend aid but did shift funds towards civil 
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society organizations and refrained from giving direct support to the government (Kausch et al 
2006: 220). The EU (Commission) 51 also decided to freeze some of its direct aid to the Ethiopian 
government, and the World Bank52 showed its displeasure by threatening to cut aid.  
 
As I have already mentioned, Meles Zenawi’s initial pledge for democratization in the first half of 
1990s had earned him US′ support and President Bill Clinton appreciated him as part of a “new 
generation of leaders.” Addis Ababa-based Western diplomats also admired Meles as a “visionary 
thinker.” Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was also credited for “bringing a greater sense of democracy and 
openness” in the country (Pflanz 27 June 2005). However, soon Meles Zenawi reverted to 
dictatorship and his actions in the 2005 election clearly showed the derailment of the 
democratization process in the country. The surprising thing is that even after massacring more 
than 193 demonstrators and detaining more than 40, 000  people (Washington Times 18 October 
2006) in the 2005 post-election violence many Western leaders still believed that Meles Zenawi was 
not personally responsible for the election killings.53 
 
We can give various reasons for Western donors’ decision to continue their relations with Meles 
Zenawi’s government after the 2005 election crises. The major reasons are: (a) Ethiopia’s role in the 
US-led anti-terrorism campaigns (b) Ethiopia’s so-called “economic achievement” (c) The China 
factor (d) Western donors’ fear that strong  pressure on the Ethiopian government would induce 
instability and the disintegration of the country (e) The absence of strong and reliable Opposition in 
Ethiopia (f) The donors’ assumption that if they pushed Meles strongly he could end up in 
attacking Eritrea and would re-ignite the border war54 (g) The donors’ fear that the poor people of 
Ethiopia would suffer if economic sanctions were applied55(Dadge 19 May 2009; IRIN 30 
December 2005), and (h) Western donors’ assumption that pushing Meles Zenawi too far might 
force him to end up in dictatorship (Berhanu 1998EC: 422). Let me elaborate. 
 
(a) Ethiopia’s Role in Anti-Terrorism Campaigns 
The issue of terrorism, particularly Ethiopia’s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns in the 
Horn of Africa is a key factor that forced Western donors, especially the United States to 
accommodate the anti-democratic practices of Meles Zenawi (Carothers 2007: 8; Dadge 19 May 
2009). Ethiopia is a regional power in the Horn, an area that has become a breeding place for 
Islamic militant groups, particularly in the state-less Somalia56 (McLaughlin 07 November 2005; 
Wondwosen and Jerusalem 2008: 196-214). The United States, according to Richard Cornwell of 
the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria (South Africa), is not willing to press the Ethiopian 
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government too hard because, “Ethiopia is a major player in terms of American counter-terror strategy” 
(McLaughlin 20 October 2005). According to Mc Laughlin (The Christian Science Monitor 20 
October 2005), “Ethiopia’s value to the US stems in part from region’s geography. The nation shares a long 
stretch of border with Somalia, a lawless country where Al Qaeda and other Islamic militant groups have been known 
to operate”. As AP (10 June 2005) notes, the United State regards Meles Zenawi “as a progressive 
African leader and key partner in the war on terror”.57 
 
These days, it has become a fashion for many African leaders including Ethiopia′s leaders to 
participate (or at least give lip services) in the anti-terror campaigns to tap the economic and 
political support from the United States and other European countries.58 As a reward, the TPLF-
EPRDF government of Ethiopia has been flooded with increasing Western economic and political 
support. At present, the West is ready to tolerate or accommodate African incumbents’ power 
abuses and human rights violations as long as they follow pro-Western economic and political 
policies including anti-terrorism.59 The Ethiopian government joined the US-led anti-terrorism 
campaigns right after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York. Meles Zenawi became 
very active in the counter-terrorism campaigns, particularly after the 2005 election to appease 
Western donors’ who were embarrassed and dismayed by his actions against the peaceful 
demonstrators60. As part of this strategy, Meles Zenawi ordered Ethiopian troops to occupy 
Somalia61 in 2006 by exaggerating the Islamists’ threats to Ethiopia. It is believed that Meles Zenawi 
intervened in Somalia, principally to repair his government’s relation with the US, which was 
severely damaged due to the 2005 post-election violence (Wachter 14 February 2007). It is 
interesting to note that after the change of administration in the United States and the withdrawal 
of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, Meles Zenawi’s intervention in Somalia is getting increasing 
criticisms from many corners62 (see Newsweek 20 April 2009). 
 
(b) Ethiopia’s “Economic Achievement” 
Despite many local criticisms the economic policies of Meles Zenawi’s government (except the land 
policy and the state monopoly on the telecommunications) have drawn appreciations from the 
Western donors. One of those who strongly admired the economic policies of Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi is Jeffrey Sachs, the Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, and who 
is the head of the United Nations Millennium Project. Sachs has been constantly recommending 
Ethiopia for increasing aid under the United Nations Millennium Project (McGill 19 July 2004). 
Another world class economist, Joseph Stiglitz also appreciates Meles Zenawi’s economic policies 
(IDPM 4 April 2001; Stiglitz 2007). According to his testimony,63 since Meles Zenawi took power, 
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“The growth in the economy has been fantastic, growing at 5% a year.” Moreover, Meles Zenawi “had a policy 
that was directed towards the poor, to the rural sector, which is where 85% of the people lived” (IDPM 4 April 
2001). In his article for the Atlantic Monthly, Joseph Stiglitz appreciated Meles Zenawi and admired 
his integrity. He says, Meles Zenawi was “quick to investigate any accusations of corruptions in his 
government”64 (McGill 19 July 2004). Mike Pflanz of the Christian Science Monitor (27 June 2005) 
also credited Meles for the “economic progress” he has brought to Ethiopia: “Roads which used to be 
dirt tracks are now paved, cutting transport time from farmer’s fields to markets. More children are in school, with 
more school books and more teachers teaching them. Mobile phone base stations have sprung up above mud and 
thatch huts, bringing local businessmen closer” (Pflanz 27 June 2005).65As I have attempted to explain, it is 
true that many Westerners have recognized Meles Zenawi’s efforts for a “rapid economic growth.” 
It is on this ground the first Yara prize for a green revolution was awarded to him on September 3, 
2005 in Oslo, Norway.66 Moreover, soon he was invited to attend the G20 meeting, which was held 
in London in April 2009 (Deutsche Welle 2 April 2009). Though he got the privilege to attend and 
represent Africa in the meeting due to his position as the chairman of the NEPAD, Meles Zenawi 
attempted to exploit the occasion to repair his tarnished image locally and internationally67. 
 
On the other hand, the economic policies of Meles Zenawi have drawn various criticisms. 
According to Eviator (7 November 2004), “Although Ethiopia’s communists rulers were overthrown more 
than a decade ago, private land ownership is still forbidden, destroying farmers’ incentives to improve the soil.” At the 
Council on Foreign Relations, Andrew Natsios, the head of the USAID, had challenged Jeffrey 
Sachs. In a public debate he argued that Ethiopia has “the worst economic policies next to Zimbabwe in 
Africa”, and the donors’ economic assistance to Ethiopia was an example of a wasted foreign aid 
(Eviatar 7 November 2004). Recently, in her sensational book titled “Dead Aid: Why Aid is not 
Working and How there is a Better way for Africa”, Dambisa Moyo (2009) has used Ethiopia as a 
case study to criticize the ineffectiveness of the foreign aid in Africa. The other scholar who 
criticized Meles Zenawi’s economic policy is Franklin Cudjoe. According to Cudjoe (14 December 
2005),  
“Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi believes that allowing Ethiopians to own their land would 
make them sell out to multinationals. He seems to have overlooked a basic market practice: It 
demands a willing seller and a willing buyer at an agreed price. If that price is worth selling for, the 
farmer might have some money to reinvest elsewhere. If that price is worth buying for, the purchaser 
must have plans to make the land profitable. If there is no sale, owners might have an incentive to 
invest in their won land and future, having, at last, the collateral of the land on which to get a loan”.  
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Cudjoe (14 December 2005) pointed out that, 
 “After decades of Socialism, Ethiopia’s agricultural sector- the mainstay of the economy – is less 
productive per capita than 20 years ago when Band Aid tried to defeat famine. Although 60% of the 
country is arable, only 10% has been cultivated. Ethiopia is entirely dependent on donations; but 
instead of grasping reality, Mr. Mr. Zenawi, a member of Tony Blair’s “Commission for Africa,” is 
forcing resettlement on 2.2 million people”.  
 
According to many local critics, the economic growth of Ethiopia is deliberately exaggerated by the 
TPLF-EPRDF government. Once, Meles Zenawi claimed that the country’s economic growth in 
2009 would be 11.2% (The Reporter 07 March 2009). But IMF’s representative in Ethiopia slashed 
it to 6.5% (The Reporter 07 March 2009), and the World Bank confirmed IMF’s figure (Daily 
Monitor 9 April 2009). Furthermore, many local critics do not buy this “economic progress” of 
Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi. Though it is true that there are many constructions of buildings and 
industries in the country, they argue that most of these new buildings and industries are owned by 
top ruling party officials and their business associates68 (Seid 06 September 2008; 5 April 2009; 
Wachter 14 February 2007) who belong to the ethnic minority Tigreans (see Yeginbot 7 Dimts 4 
Sene/June/ 2001EC). Moreover, since the coming to power of Meles Zenawi, the majority of 
Ethiopian people are not in a position even to get a daily bread. Many local critics have also blamed 
Meles Zenawi for giving false promises and for releasing fantastic statistics to impress the donors 
(Seid 16 June 2008). It has to be recalled that in 1991 Meles Zenawi officially declared that every 
Ethiopian would eat at least two times a day with in few years (The Reporter 22 March 2009b). 
However, after 19 years of the TPLF rule the majority of the people are still struggling to eat even 
once in a day.69 
 
C. The China Factor 
The third factor is Western donors’ fear that if they pushed the Ethiopian government too hard it 
would end up in China’s hands. In 2004, China’s export to Ethiopia was over 93% of the two 
countries′ bilateral trade (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:220). Moreover, in August 2005, 
Lieutenant General Zhu Wenquan of China and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi agreed that “Ethiopia 
and China shall forge mutual cooperation in military training, exchange of military technologies, and peacekeeping 
missions, among others” (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006:222). Until recently, the influence of China in 
Africa including Ethiopia was insignificant (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). In the last few years, 
however, China’s relations with African countries have dramatically increased. In the 1990s, the 
Sino-African trade increased by 700%. Between 2000 and 2003 it reached $18.5 billion, and in 2005 
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it jumped to $32.2 billion (The Guardian 7 October 2006). China has out-gunned the former trade 
and business partners of Africa (i.e. the US and the UK), and pushed them to third and fourth 
places. In the last few years, China has become a chief contender against France, Africa’s number 
one trade partner, and if the situation continues in this way, it is highly likely that China will also 
overtake France (The Guardian 7 October 2006).  
 
China has become very attractive to African dictators and electoral autocrats because it offers a 
“rouge aid”, i.e., “development assistance that is non democratic in origin and non transparent in practice; its effect 
is typically to stifle real progress while hurting average citizens” (Naim 2007). The driving forces for this 
Chinese “aid” are money, access for raw materials, and international politics70. China has a number 
of objectives in dealing with African countries. In the economic sphere, it wants to consolidate its 
energy and mineral supplies from Africa. Politically, China’s relation with Africa is directed against 
Taiwan, former Chinese province. During the Cold War there were many African countries that 
had recognized Taiwan. One of the aims of China, therefore, is to control and reduce the influence 
of Taiwan in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War China has been following its “one-China” 
policy aggressively and many African countries such as Ethiopia have taken measures to satisfy the 
Chinese political interest. Recently, the parliament of Ethiopia passed a resolution supporting 
China’s anti-secession law that targeted Taiwan (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006).71 Many other 
African countries such as Ginea-Bissau, Uganda, Namibia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Gabon, Central 
African Republic, Rwanda, Lesotho, Burundi, Comoros, Zambia, Nigeria, Eritrea, and Mauritania 
have also supported China’s anti-secession law. Recently, the African Union has passed a resolution 
to support the one-China policy.72 
 
At present, China is being criticized for supporting African authoritarian rulers. According to 
Eisenman and Kurlantzick (2006),“Chinese support .... has helped African leaders maintain controls on 
information.”  This is conducted by training African regimes on press and internet monitoring 
(Ibid).73 Moreover, there is a credible fear that “China’s unwillingness to put any conditions on its assistance 
to Africa could undermine years of international efforts to link aid to better governance” (The Guardian 7 
October 2006). Recently, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, has said “business is 
business, and China separates business from politics” (The Guardian 7 October 2006). China also offers 
political assistance even to the worst African dictators in return for economic gains. One clear 
example is its support to the Sudanese government on the issue of Darfur. China has been blocking 
the drafted measures against the Sudanese government by using its status as a member of the 
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United Nation’s Security Council despite the latter’s alleged role in the Darfur genocide (Eisenman 
and Kurlantzick 2006:223).74 
 
To be fair, we have to admit that Africa has also benefited a lot from the Chinese investments in 
electricity, telecommunications, mining, transportation, and oil production. However, as The 
Guardian (7 October 2006) rightly puts it, “Africa’s economy may grow, but Africans will continue to 
suffer.”75 The other factor that contributed for the rise of China’s influence in Africa is the 
indifference of the United States towards Africa. Africa had not been a priority for US foreign 
policy, until al-Qaida attacked New York in September 11, 2001. After this incident the US initiated 
anti-terrorism or counter terrorism pact with African countries especially with North Africa and 
East Africa (The Guardian 7 October 2006).  
 
In order to attract African countries, China has forwarded a debt relief programs. For instance, in 
2000, China cancelled $1.2 billion of African debt and also wrote off $750 million in 2003. 
According to Meles Zenawi, one of China’s allies in Africa “China’s exemplary endeavor to ease African 
countries’ debt problem is indeed a true expression of solidarity and commitment” (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 
2006). Africa has also become a favorite market for China’s arms industry. Between 1996 and 2003 
China was the second top supplier of arms to Africa next to Russia. According to Eisenman and 
Kurlantzick (2006), “In particular, China has developed close military ties with Zimbabwe, Sudan and Ethiopia, 
three of Africa’s most strategically important States”.  
 
(d) The Western donors’ fear that that any instability dismantles Ethiopia 
Due to the fragile nature of Ethiopian politics and the ethnic diversity of the country, the Western 
donors have a nagging fear that strong donor pressure for more democratization could weaken the 
state authority and disrupt the country’s transition to democracy, and finally might lead the nation 
and the region to political instability. This fear has made the donors to be reluctant in pressuring 
Ethiopias′ government for more democratic reforms (Berhanu 1998EC: 563).76 Actually, Western 
donors have also similar fear for many ethnically divided African countries. According to Brown 
(2005: 189), “African popular mobilizations ignite a fear of the mob and the sense that anything could happen. 
Donors and domestic elites are concerned with potential violence, loss of life, populist or socialist policies, property 
damage, impaired production, interruptions of trade, increased refugee flows or missed debt repayments. The more 
radical potential of fundamental reform threatens donors’ interests and incites them to seek accommodations that will 
restore order, at the expense of progressive change”. 
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The ruling party of Ethiopia has cleverly exploited this fear of the Western donors and has been 
openly claiming that the country would disintegrate if the TPLF-EPRDF loses political power 
(Berhanu 1998EC: 340, 580-581).77 In fact, as early as 1991 the TPLF-EPRDF has been following a 
well-executed plan of “scare tactic” to convince the Western donors that ethnic federalism78 was the 
only way out for Ethiopia’s political problems and the TPLF-EPRDF is the only savior of the 
country from a total collapse. Moreover, the ruling party has been stifling and persecuting the non-
ethnic and pan-Ethiopian parties that opposed the ruling party’s ethnic politics. The TPLF-EPRDF 
government has been accusing the pan-Ethiopian parties as “chauvinist parties” that would not 
hesitate “to take away the rights and the privileges of the ethnic minorities” and “create instability 
and chaos in the country.”79 
 
(e) The absence of strong opposition in Ethiopia 
The fifth factor is the absence of strong opposition that could replace to the TPLF-EPRDF 
government and maintain stability in the country. The Western donors consider Ethiopian 
opposition parties as fragmented, fragile, weak, irresponsible and undemocratic. Moreover, they 
have suspicions that the Ethiopian opposition groups are “very hawkish about Eritrea”, and would re-
kindle the war with a neighboring Eritrea if they got political power (see Berhanu 1998EC: 423; 
McLaughlin 07 November 2005).80 This exaggerated fear of the Western donors has helped the 
TPLF-EPRDF′s government tremendously.  
 
It is true, after 1991 many opposition parties, particularly ethnic-based political parties have 
emerged in the country, and the TPLF-EPRDF, as an ethnic-based party coalition, has been 
encouraging the formation of political parties along ethnic lines and tacitly discouraged the non-
ethnic or pan-Ethiopian parties.81 Moreover, though the TPLF-EPRDF government has also 
allowed non-ethnic parties to be formed still the government is busy in creating obstacles to them.82 
Therefore, at present, there are only very few non-ethnic parties in the country that aim to unite all 
Ethiopians under a pan-Ethiopia umbrella83. Furthermore, the TPLF-EPRDF-dominated 
government harasses and persecutes those non-ethnic parties, particularly the ones that have the 
potential to unite the people. As Harbeson (1996) said, in the first half of the 1990s, individuals and 
groups who were identified with the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) were not legally allowed to 
participate in the country’s politics. Moreover, those political organizations that refused to renounce 
armed struggle are still banned. Therefore, The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the 
“All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement” (i.e., MEISON), OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), ONLF 
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(Ogaden National Liberation Front) and other similar political groups are not allowed to participate 
in the Ethiopian politics (Wondwosen 2008a: 780-809).  
 
As Chege et al (2007) noted, from 1995 to 2004, despite the mushrooming of political parties in the 
country, the freedom of opposition parties to freely operate was so circumscribed that none of 
them even had the slightest chance of competing against the TPLF-EPRDF. In the 2005 
parliamentary election, however, for the first time the ruling party allowed opposition parties to 
freely campaign and compete for political power. In this election, the opposition parties, particularly 
the CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) and the UEDF (United Ethiopia Democratic 
Front) openly challenged the incumbent party and scored high electoral results84. Alarmed by the 
election results and the success of the opposition parties, the incumbent party flexed its military 
muscle and smashed the Opposition’s electoral victories. In the post-election period in 2005, the 
CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy), the most influential and successful non-ethnic 
opposition party, was severely persecuted by the government. The cadres of the TPLF-dominated 
government branded the CUD as a party supported only by the “chauvinist” Amhara people (BBC 
23 July 2007; Berhanu 1998EC: 423) that fights for the “Amhara supremacy” (Abbink 2006: 173-
179) though the leadership and the membership of the CUD party showed heavy ethnic diversity85. 
When the propaganda campaign that was designed to mobilize other ethnic groups against the 
CUD failed, the government brought the CUD leaders to court86 and they were sentenced to life 
imprisonment on fabricated charges of “genocide”, “treason” and “attempt to topple the 
constitutional order by force.”87 Finally, due to the international outcry and domestic pressure, they 
were given “clemency.” After crushing the pro-democracy movement that engulfed the country by 
killing, arresting and intimidating many Opposition leaders and their supporters, the government 
deliberately shrank the political space. At present, almost all the legally- registered opposition 
parties (except the fake opposition groups) are unable to conduct their activities freely.88 For all 
practical purposes, as Chege et al (2007: 35-36) noted, contemporary Ethiopia can be accurately 
described as a one party-dominated state.  
 
4. Conclusions 
During the Cold War, the Western donors were giving foreign aid even to dictatorial regimes, 
sometimes, preventing transitions to democratic rule (Brown 2005:179-180). Since the end of the 
Cold War, with the hope of improving the accuracy, efficiency and the legitimacy of elections in 
transitional democracies, the Western donors have been giving democracy promotion assistance in 
a broad range of activities. The assistance includes financial and technical supports for 
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constitutional and legal reforms, for the creation and functioning of electoral management bodies, 
for voter registration and education initiatives (Reilly 2003: 13). In this period, though the Western 
donors attached foreign aid to political and economic reforms, the result was not satisfactory. As 
observed in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, strings-attached aid perhaps 
was successful in facilitating a transition from one party state to a multi-party system. But for sure 
as I have tried to explain in this paper, it has failed in helping countries to successfully complete 
their transition to a consolidated democracy largely due to the Western donors’ lack of 
commitment and follow-ups (caused by their competing economic, commercial and strategic 
interests) (Brown 2005: 179), and the domestic conditions in the recipient countries (e.g. the refusal 
or the reluctance of electoral autocrats for further democratization and their alliance with non-
democratic countries such as China).  
 
Though donors threaten to terminate or reduce aid unless the recipient country respects human 
rights, usually the rhetoric is not followed by actions. As Lawson (1999: 23) argues, the international 
pressure on African electoral autocrats lacks sufficient commitment. In Ethiopia, for instance, the 
British threatened to cut aid because of the Ethiopian government’s human rights violations in the 
2005 post-election crises. However, due to various reasons which are explained in this paper the 
British government decided not to implement it. According to Carey (2006: 22), despite the rhetoric 
of the British government, “The Ethiopian Finance Minister Sufyan Ahmad was confident aid would not be 
reduced”.89 European donors such as Germany, France, Britain and even the European Commission 
still do not show commitment and their aid policies do not give sufficient emphasis to human 
rights records of the recipient countries (Carey 2006). As the World Bank (1998) noted, cited by 
Carey (2006: 3), in low-income countries, a foreign aid is the major source of external finance. 
Therefore, had donors showed a genuine commitment to democratization and human rights issues 
in transitional democracies, political situations would have got a better chance for improvement.90 
According to Carey (2006: 2), despite paying a lip service to democratization in Africa, still 
“bureaucratic inertia and colonial ties are the main determinants of who receives aid and how much aid is given to a 
particular country”.  
 
The democratic transition in Ethiopia that started in 1991 with the coming to power of the TPLF-
EPRDF is in a very dangerous situation. At present, the country is not moving to a consolidated 
democracy,91 but to a hybrid system, and there is a concrete evidence that soon it will end up in 
absolute form of authoritarian rule.92 The massacre of many peaceful protestors in the 2005 
Ethiopian election, according to Rakner and Menocal (2007:19), showed the government’s shifts 
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toward authoritarianism, and “when faced with the real threat of being ousted from power, the incumbent 
EPRDF was determined to stay in power by all means”. 
 
According to McLaughlin (07 November 2005), in the post Cold War period, a rapid economic 
growth was seen in some African countries such as Ethiopia and Uganda. For instance, Ethiopia’s 
economy showed 12% growth in 2004. The economic growth has helped the government of Meles 
Zenawi to get a strong support from the Western donors (McLaughlin 07 November 2005). 
However, as Chris Tomlinson (13 May 2005) said, the 2005 election violence and the way it was 
handled has put a question mark on the reliability of the Ethiopian and the other African leaders 
who have been giving promises to democratize their countries and adhere to good governance in 
return for greater aid and debt relief. A week after the outbreak of the first electoral violence in 
2005 Chris Tomlinson confessed, “The type of backsliding into old authoritarian ways seen last week in 
Ethiopia’s Capital could be an excuse for the world to turn its back on the continent once again, fearing any aid given 
now could be wasted like the money given to African dictators during the cold war” (The Bakersfield Californian 
14 June 2005). According to Tomlinson, “For the Ethiopian government, the trick is to walk a fine line 
between reforming as much as necessary to keep foreign aid coming, while still ensuring the ruling party’s hold on 
power (The Bakersfield Californian 14 June 2005). The Herald (04 November 2005) also said, “Meles 
has been lauded in the West as a new kind of African leader, appointed by Tony Blair to his Commission for Africa 
to help draft a blue print for ending poverty and building democracy. However, his government has little tolerance for 
dissent and has been accused of severe human rights abuses”. 
 
In conclusion, we can say that the Western donors’ democracy promotion assistance that has been 
provided to Ethiopia since 1991 has given little attention to the independence, accountability, 
transparency and the sustainability of the recipient state and the non-state actors such as the 
electoral management body (NEBE), civil society, political parties, courts, parliament, the media 
etc. Therefore, Western donors’ assistance has failed to bring a long term impact on the process of 
democratization in the country. Though it is usually said that Western donors’ assistance has been 
instrumental in fostering democratic initiatives in Ethiopia, this paper concludes that the donors’ 
democracy assistance is not as effective as it should have been due to the various reasons explained 
in this paper. The pro-democracy movement that engulfed the country in the 2005 parliamentary 
election which saw the involvement of civil society and the independent media, and the stunning 
electoral gains of the pro-democracy opposition parties were brutally crushed by the TPLF-EPRDF 
government. Western donors did not take any tangible measure against the Ethiopian government 
mainly due to the latter′s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaigns in the Horn of Africa and 
 
Teshome, W. (2013). Democracy promotion and Western aid to Africa: Lessons from Ethiopia (1991-2012). International 




Meles Zenawi’s membership in Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa (Dadge 19 May 2009). 
According to Herman Cohen (VOA 16 May 2006), the former US Assistant Secretary of the State 
for Africa, conflicting interests prevented Westerner donors from applying more pressure on the 
Ethiopian government in the areas of governance and human rights. “The western countries have to 
balance interests. They are interested in better human rights and more democracy in Ethiopia. At the same time, they 
are interested in maintaining stability and security. So it’s very difficult for the West to be harsh with the Ethiopian 
government while at the same time ask for their cooperation,” he said. 
 
The Western donors once again demonstrated that even after the end of the Cold War, they are still 
following the policy of rewarding or tolerating dictatorships in developing countries as long as the 
autocratic leaders show solidarity with the West’s security interests93. Moreover, the Ethiopian 
experience revealed that the strong desire which Western donors showed for African 
democratization in the 1990s is gradually fading away in the last few years. What exists today, 
according to Joseph (1999: 70), is the “convergence and compromise between the interests of Western powers and 
African states…. .....in the tacit acceptance of virtual democracies as an acceptable form of governance”.  
 
Today, in many African transitional democracies the process of democratization appears to be 
backsliding, and authoritarian governments such as China have started to replace the Western 
donors as a source of economic support and hence good alternatives for electoral to achieve 
development without having engaging in risky democratic and social reforms. Therefore, the 
United States and the European Union should have a responsibility in recovering the status of 
democracy promotion, which was battered during George Bush’s administration. The election of 
Barak Obama as the US president should be used as the right opportunity to save the African 
transitional democracies from their manipulative electoral autocrats such as the TPLF leaders, and 
to return them to the right track of the democratization process. As Michalski (2009: 3) notes, 
“There is clearly a window of opportunity” for both the US and the EU, “To advance shared 
principles and values”. “Of course” it should be noted, as Leicht (2009) argued, “donors cannot and 
should not dictate policy to Ethiopia's government and there is no question that Ethiopia, one of the world's poorest 
countries, needs support. But this does not mean that donors should ignore the reality that their important material 
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1 There are three types of foreign aid: (1) Humanitarian relief aid- This is given to victims of natural 
disasters such as famine, earthquake, flood etc. (2) Military aid (3) Economic development aid (i.e. 
official development assistance (ODA)). The sources of ODA are bilateral donors (government to 
government), and multilateral donors such as The World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation, the European Development Bank, the OPEC 
Special Fund, etc. For Berhanu (2001:169), development aid “involves the transfer of resources from official 
or private institutions to low-income economies in the form of loans on concessional terms, technical assistance, and 
outright grants”. 
2 For Van Hüllen and Stahn (2007), international democracy promotion is “an external actor’s explicit 
attempt to directly establish or advance democracy as a regime type in a target country”. 
3 Despite its growth, democracy aid still comprises less than 10% of the overall aid funding (Siegle 
2007: 4). 
4 According to Youngs (2008b: 160-161), recently the United Kingdom has surpassed Germany in 
political foreign aid spending. 
5 According to Karume (2003: 3), “While donors in general do not fund political parties, as it is prohibited by 
electoral acts of most recipient countries, they do offer assistance in terms of training, seminars and conferences.” As 
Deegan (2003: 2) notes, “The international donor community was fearful of directly involving itself in party 
development, preferring instead to fund NGOs which did not arouse accusations of political interference.” However, 
at present, even Western democracy aid to NGOs/CSOs in Africa has met serious opposition from 
electoral autocrats as the case of Ethiopia clearly demonstrates. Recently, the Ethiopian 
government has introduced a repressive proclamation criminalizing the involvement of foreign 
NGOs/CSOs in human rights activities (see Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95). 
6 Carlson and Walecki (2006: 7) argue that in post-conflict elections funding from illegal sources, 
Diaspora groups and foreign nationals “can hinder reconciliation between formerly warring factions and efforts 
to replace the bullets with ballots.” 
7 For details on authoritarian practices of party leaders in Africa, see Wondwosen (2009c: 1-15). 
8 The foundations are associated with various German parties: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) with 
the Social Democrats (SPD), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) with the Christian Democrats 
(CDU); Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) with the Liberal Party; Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS) 
with the Bavarian Christian Social Union; Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung (HBS) with the Green party 
(Wondwosen 2009e: 119-132). 
9 International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (formerly, the “International Foundation 
for Election Systems”). 
10 According to Solomon Abebe, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, the 
representatives of the three American organizations entered Ethiopia with a tourist visa “without 
getting any authority or without making any agreement with the concerned bodies “(AP 31 March 2005) (For 
details, see Wondwosen 2008b: 119-137). 
11 The donors supported the contending political parties and the independent candidates through 
ERIS in close cooperation with the NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia). According to 
NEBE, in line with the agreement between the NEBE and ERIS, the donors (through ERIS) 
handed over the cash to the NEBE, and the NEBE purchased election-related goods and 
distributed them to the participant parties and the independent candidates (The Ethiopian Herald 
18 August 2005; 26 July 2005). 
12 In this case, the amount of money offered by the ERIS was for 75 candidates in each political 
party. 
13 According to the former CUD official, Berhanu Nega (1998 BC: 279-283), the European Union 
(through the UNDP) gave the CUD around 43, 000 USD (in kind) during the 2005 parliamentary 
election. 
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14 For details see ERIS (Electoral Reform International Services): “2005 Ethiopian National 
Elections.” Joint International Donor Election Support Programme. <http://www.eris.org.uk> 
15 ERIS gave financial/material assistance not only to the political parties, but also to various 
CSOs/NGOs that facilitated the 2005 Ethiopian election. For instance, Fafen Development, a local 
NGO, received financial/material support from ERIS to its project that involved giving training on 
election-related issues in the Somali regional election (The Ethiopian Herald 26 July 2005). 
16 Donno (2006: 4) argues that for any opposition party “an international verdict that elections were 
manipulated can be a tremendous boon, boosting its popular support, discrediting the incumbent and increasing its 
chances for victory via clean elections in the future.”  
17 For instance, according to Brown (2001), in Kenya (in the 1990s) donors showed lack of 
commitment for a genuine poll and attempted to derail the peoples’ attempt for more democratic 
political system. In the 2005 parliamentary election in Ethiopia, the African Union election 
observers and the Carter Center approved the election in spite of the fact that the ruling EPRDF 
party rigged the election (Wondwosen 2008b: pp. 119-137). 
18 Various international election observers signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
NEBE. For instance, a memorandum of understanding between the NEBE and the European 
Union concerning election observation was signed by the then NEBE Chairman, Kemal Bedri 
Kelo, and Timothy Clarke, the EU representative in Ethiopia, on March 12, 2005 in Addis Ababa. 
19 The best example here is the recent proclamation in Ethiopia on NGOs/CSOs (For details, see 
Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95). 
20 For instance, Belarus president, Alexandr Lukashenka, said “all colored revolutions are pure and simple 
banditry”……… “In our country, there will be no pink or orange, or even banana revolution” (NED 2006: 6). 
21 It is reported that Alexandr Lukashenka of Belarus acquired China’s latest internet monitoring 
technology while in Beijing in December 2005 (NED 2006: 7).  
22 The major donor countries to African civil society organizations are the United States, Germany, 
the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada (Robinson 1996: 209). 
23 For instance, as narrated by Eizenstat (2004: 20), the US government decided to provide financial 
support to Palestine through NGOs rather than funneling funds through the official government 
channels due to the corruption and poor management style of the Palestinian government. Similar 
situation occurred in Ethiopia in the post-2005 election, where Western donors such as Britain 
decided to channel aid through NGOs rather than through the EPRDF government due to its 
human rights violations and the violent crackdown of election protestors (ODI 20 January 2006). 
As Ottaway (2005: 131) argues, though governments in developing countries welcome foreign 
funding to charitable organizations, for sure, they are uncomfortable with foreign funding of 
advocacy organizations. 
24 In Ethiopia, after 2001 SIDA supported those NGOs/CSOs involved in human rights issues and 
democracy awareness such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, the Ethiopian Women 
Lawyers’ Association and the Ethiopian Economic Association (Kausch et al 2006: 195). In 2004, 
SIDA allocated 2.6 million euros for democratic governance projects, 7% of its total aid to Ethiopia 
(Kausch et al 2006: 195). 
25 A large number of civil society organizations in Africa are heavily dependent on Western donors. 
This is true even in the former socialist countries of East Europe. For instance, for Lane (2006: 16) 
the major obstacle for civil society’s structural improvements in Poland is their dependency on 
sponsors, most of which are foreign donors. 
26 Appiagyei-Atua (n.d) argues that in Africa the suppression of the traditional notion of civil society 
has paved a way for the “importation of the Western European Colonialists’ own version of civil society”. 
27 In the current economic situations in Africa this proposal is highly unlikely to be implemented. 
28 In Ethiopia, it has become increasingly difficult to give democracy aid to non-state actors due the 
government’s obstructionist policy. The recently-declared civil society and media laws are parts of 
the government’s policy of obstructing the democracy assistance (see Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95; 
2009b:84-112). 
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29 Many Ethiopian scholars, particularly in the Diaspora, believe that Western aid has enabled Meles 
Zenawi’s government to stay in power despite his defeat in the 2005 election. In many cities of 
Europe and the Unites States, Diaspora Ethiopians have held demonstrations asking Western 
donors to stop supporting Meles Zenawi’s government, particularly after the 2005 election (See 
Angola Press 08 July 2005; EMF 2 April 2009; Sudan Tribune 9 November 2005; The Washington 
Times 9 July 2005). 
30 This is particularly true during the Cold War. For instance, Chomsky and Herman (1979) argued 
that foreign aid strengthened military dictators during the Cold War. For Danaher, Berryman, and 
Benjamin (1987), aid simply extends the tenure in office of the elites (ruling class) in developing 
countries and give them a chance to continuously suppress their people.  
31The young leaders of those countries were acclaimed by Western governments and media as “the 
next-generation of great leaders.” The leaders of these countries fought their way to political power 
through bloody guerrilla wars. As soon as they got political power, they allowed opposition parties 
to function in their respective countries, giving a green signal for a democratization process. “But 
they’re balking at the final step in democracy’s process: giving power” (Mc Laughlin 07 November 2005).  
32 According to Knack (2004) and Goldsmith (2001), international aid to developing countries can 
increase democracy level by increasing literacy, health and wealth factors. As Lipset (1959) and 
Barro (1997) note, these factors may lead to democratization. For Goldsmith (2001: 137) “better 
educated and healthier people, .....may make better informed and more active citizens, who are the lifeblood for 
democratic institutions”.  
33 Cinkenbeard (2002: 12-14) calls it “negative conditionality” to differentiate it from the “positive 
conditionality”, that is, non confrontational democracy promotion strategy that focuses on positive 
inducement. The EU’s democracy assistance program emphasizes a cooperative approach (i.e. 
positive conditionality), while the US employs both confrontational (negative conditionality) and 
cooperative approaches (Cinkenbeard 2002: 12-14). Clinkenbeard (2002: 12) divides aid 
conditionality in to “proactive” conditionality and “reactive” conditionality depending upon the 
phase of the democratization process of the recipient country. When the donor threatens to freeze 
aid to compel an authoritarian regime to liberalize or to democratize and hold elections is called 
“proactive” aid conditionality. On the other hand, “reactive” aid conditionality is the situation 
where the donor threatens to stop or reduce aid to a democratizing state to deter it from 
“backsliding” or to prevent it from anti-democratic reversion toward authoritarianism. 
34 Carey (2006: 5) argues that the asymmetric power relationship between the donor and the 
recipient is instrumental in the workability of aid conditionality. 
35 As Price (2009: 162) notes, “When the United States....is seen as intervening against democracy, it not only 
undermine the democracy agenda but also the credibility of US global leadership”. 
36 According to Carothers (2009:4-5), “Toward America’s two principal challengers, China and Russia, as 
well as in the many other areas of U.S. strategic or economic engagement with non democratic states, such as with 
Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, the Gulf states, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan, the Bush administration downplayed democracy 
for the sake of other interests.” 
37 According to Salih and Nordlund (2007: 22), the insistence for good governance as a 
precondition for supplying aid by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
the IMF, Western donors, and lobby groups of the Western democracies has created an 
opportunity for opposition political parties “to seek more favors from the governing political parties in return 
for silence”. 
38 One of the top Ethiopian opposition leaders, Berhanu Nega, has claimed that in the 2005 post-
election crisis, while the ruling party was facing a strong popular protest, the EU Security 
Commissioner, Louis Mitchell, confirmed the EU’s decision to work with the Ethiopian 
government and advised Meles Zenawi to solve the crisis wisely as early as possible so that the EU 
maintains its assistance (1998EC: 422-423). It is interesting to note that disappointed by the 
measures of the European countries, particularly when Germany extended an invitation to Meles 
Zenawi to attend the German African Forum hosted by the German President, and due to Tony 
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Blair’s letter of congratulations to Meles Zenawi on his election for a third five-year term (after 
massacring many people in June and November electoral conflicts) Prof. Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 
the noted Ethiopian scholar and human rights activist-turned politician, condemned Western 
democracies for their failure to genuinely supporting the democratic process in Ethiopia. According 
to him, “It is a mockery of human rights when such leading democratic countries as Germany and Britain greet the 
leader of a country only a few days after his government was involved in mass murder of demonstrators” (Monsters 
and Critics 27 November 2005). 
Moreover, disgusted by Western donors’ duplicity a veteran Ethiopian diplomat, Imru Zeleke, sent 
back the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit Medal, which was awarded to him by the German 
government decades ago when he was Ethiopia’s ambassador to Germany (See: Imiru Zeleke 21 
November 2005), 
<http://www.andenetdemocracy.org/archive-nov.html> (Accessed 10 December 2005). 
Furthermore, annoyed by the EU Commission’s actions, Ana Gomes, who was the head of the 
EU-EOM in the 2005 Ethiopian election, repeatedly urged the Commission to change its stance 
regarding the government of Meles Zenawi (see The Guardian 19 October 2006; The New York 
Times 14 November 2005, 19 October 2006; Yeroo Jimma Times 11-11-2008). 
39 Aid conditionality has two sub-sections: “political conditionality” and “economic conditionality”. 
Political conditionality is, “Cutting, or cutting off aid when democracy, human rights or corruption worsens” 
(Lekvall 2009-05-13). On the other hand, economic conditionality targets the economic policies of 
the recipient country.  
40 The influential Indian liberation fighter, Mohandas K. Gandhi, was also the earliest proponent of 
this idea. He said, “The spirit of democracy can not be imposed from without. It has to come from within” 
(Tendulkar 1961:301). 
41 For many centuries in the past political realism, which is the brain child of Machiavelli (Whelan 
2004) was dominant. In the contemporary world, as cited by Hoffmann (1999), realists like Kennan 
and Carr and Oppenheim, argue for less ethical considerations in the international politics. 
42 After studying the US’ foreign aid policy in the past, Peceny (1999) (cited in Brown 2005: 188) 
concluded that “the US has historically subordinated democracy promotion to its security interests.” 
43 In the 2005 election, Ethiopia was expected to demonstrate its path to democracy because the US 
administration had openly declared that the US would no longer need authoritarian allies, and 
rather would give priority for democracy and freedom. According to Jimmy Carter, the former 
president of the United States, “A democratically elected government would be an ideal partner of the United 
States in the war against international terrorism” (Wondwosen 2008b: 129). Just few days before the May 
2005 election, Chris Tomlinson (13 May 2005) wrote that “legitimacy is important to Meles, who has a 
reputation for being one of the more progressive leaders in Africa. Ethiopia has also become one of the US’s closest 
allies and a key player in the war on terrorism. With the US administration placing a high value on freedom and 
democracy and saying the US will no longer put up with authoritarian allies, Ethiopia must demonstrate at least 
some progress in this election”. Roughly, the donor countries offered $1.9 billion assistance to Ethiopia 
annually and they were pressuring the government to conduct free and fair election. The donor 
countries considered election in Ethiopia as a litmus test for the ruling party’s commitment to 
democratic reform. That is why, a year before the 2005 election, Louis Michel, EU’s Development 
and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner, said “we are in a much stronger position to make progress on human 
rights issues with direct budget support because the stakes are so much higher” (Mail & Guardian 19 December 
2004). The EU alone, for instance, pledged to give Ethiopia $466million in budgetary support from 
2005 to 2008, and Louis Michel hoped this financial support would be used as “leverage” over the 
Ethiopian government authorities (Mail & Guardian 19 December 2004). According to Helga 
Graefin Strachwit, Germany’s ambassador to Ethiopia, “The question of good governance, including 
democratization, is definitely one of the criteria for direct budget support……you wouldn’t give budget support to a 
country where you were not convinced that good governance would at least be a high topic if it were not already in 
place….to give budget aid you must be convinced that the right direction at least is being taken” (Mail & Guardian 
19 December 2004). The aid flow from the donor countries to Ethiopia had been increasing every 
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year except in 1998-2000 bloody border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The war had caused the 
reduction of the donors’ aid to Ethiopia by about $600- million. Therefore, it was beyond doubt 
that in order to be sure of the continuity of the Western aid Ethiopia needed a clean election in 
May 2005. 
44 Many critics held the opinion that the June 10 Pact was the first major capitulation of the 
opposition parties to the intimidation tactics of the ruling party, and the one-sided pressure of the 
donor countries. Though, in principle, the agreement to settle the violence peacefully and to be 
abided by the decisions of the NEBE and the courts was expected from every legal political party, 
the absence of an independent electoral management body, independent courts, neutral army and 
the Police made the non-violence pact meaningless. In democratic countries, where such 
institutions are neutral and independent, legally-registered political parties are expected to be abided 
by the Constitution and the laws. However, in Ethiopia, the above-mentioned institutions are 
controlled by the incumbent party and the participation of opposition parties in the elections has 
no significance. The incumbent’s sole aim in allowing opposition parties to participate in the 
elections is for international consumption and to get legitimacy. 
45 When the opposition parties declared a three day stay-at-home strike, tension highly increased in 
the country and Western donors led by the US Embassy intervened and neutralized the 
Opposition’s plan of paralyzing the government. First, the donors defused the political tension by 
initiating a useless dialogue between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the opposition (CUD-
UEDF) representatives, Dr. Berhanu Nega and Dr. Beyene Petros. In order to start the dialogue, 
Prime Minister Meles offered a pre-condition that the opposition parties (CUD and UEDF) cancel 
the stay-at-home strike. According to Lidetu (1998EC:120-122), the Opposition agreed to cancel 
the strike due to the donors’ pressure, while Berhanu (1998EC 488-492) insisted that it was to avoid 
unnecessary confrontation with the government. The Opposition statement, released on October 1, 
2005 confirmed the donors’ intervention: “We have been in continual contact with several ambassadors and 
they have also been in contact with the Prime Minister. As a result of these discussions we have cancelled our stay-at-
home strike announced earlier today. We are committing ourselves to press for our objectives through a democratic and 
parliamentary process. We understand that based on the talks of the International Community with Prime Minister 
Meles and our declaration the talks will begin as early as tomorrow. We believe this advance the democratic process in 
a peaceful and constructive manner.” 
(See: US Embassy in Ethiopia. “Statement by Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, Charge D’Affaires of 
the U.S. Embassy, and Ambassador Bob Dewar, Ambassador of the United Kingdom. “  
<http://addisababa.usembassy.org/>). 
Following the Opposition’s statement, Prime Minister Meles agreed to talk with the Opposition. 
However, after conducting the negotiations half-heartedly for few days, the government abruptly 
terminated the dialogue (Sudan Tribune 5 October 2005). The negotiators failed even to agree on 
setting the agenda. Then, the Opposition announced the failure of the negotiation to the public on 
Friday, October 7, 2005: “We respectfully inform the Ethiopian people and the International community that the 
negotiations have been discontinued due to the intransigent position taken by EPRED”(Reuters 8 October 
2005). According to their statement, though the opposition agreed to negotiate with the EPRDF 
without any pre-conditions, still the negotiation failed. The statement said, “However EPRDF reversed 
its agreement to go into negotiation without limiting the agenda items and rejected a number of items that we wished to 
present for discussion” (Reuters 8 October 2005). According to Beyene Petros of the UEDF, the ruling 
party rejected an agenda that called for the creation of an independent body to probe into the June 
killings (Reuters 8 October 2005). Prime Minister Meles Zenawi accepted the donors’ call for a 
dialog just to buy time and to ensure the continuity of the foreign aid, which was stalled due to the 
insistence of Western donors for a dialogue (see Youngs 2008a:8). 
46 In a sample study conducted by the EU-EOM, and the opposition parties’ calculations (see 
Berhanu 1998EC: 385-386), it was revealed that the ruling party was defeated. However, Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi’s party was declared “winner” after rigging the election, as The Newsweek 
(20 April 2009) belatedly admitted. Gebru Asrat (20 September 2008) and Dadge (19 May 2009) 
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have also confirmed the stunning electoral defeat of the ruling EPRDF party in the 2005 election. 
According to the German-Foreign-Policy.com (2008-06-26), the Ethiopian government “was only 
able to survive parliamentary elections by committing massive electoral fraud.”  
47 In the various negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition parties, the Western 
donors (US and EU) were not neutral mediators. They favored the ruling party due various reasons 
as explained elsewhere in this paper. PINR (25 October 2005) described the dilemma of Western 
donors in the tense confrontation between the ruling party and the Opposition in the 2005 election 
as follows: “The strategic interests of Ethiopia's donor powers would have been served best had the opposition 
acquiesced in the electoral results and had Zenawi shown signs that he would move democratization forward. Since 
neither requisite for stability has been met, Washington and Brussels are left with a dilemma. If they back either side, 
they drive the other into opposition to them. Yet if they do not enter the fray, they risk chronic instability in a country 
that is essential to their strategic purposes in the region. For the moment, the Washington-Brussels partnership is 
reduced to calling for dialogue between the adversaries. Since the May elections, the donor powers have continued to 
provide and expand aid to the Zenawi government and to criticize it for election irregularities and suppression of 
dissent. At the same time, they have attempted to pressure the opposition to limit the scope and intensity of its 
resistance to the regime. Both adversaries have expressed their dissatisfaction with that response. Look for the donor 
powers to keep playing their waiting game, which favors Zenawi, until one of the adversaries achieves a clear 
advantage.”  
48 US’s national interests in Ethiopia include counterterrorism, economic prosperity and security, 
democracy and human rights, and regional stability (USAID 2005). 
49 In 2004, the largest three Swedish aid recipient African countries were Mozambique, Ethiopia 
and Uganda (Kausch et al 2006: 196). 
50 The repressive actions of the Ethiopian government were embarrassing to Tony Blair because he 
used to admire Meles Zenawi as part of a “new breed” of reformist African leaders. Moreover, it 
was Tony Blair who single-handedly selected Meles to be a member of his highly publicized 17-
member commission for Africa whose aim was campaigning debt relief, greater aid “and more trade 
opportunities for African countries in return for economic and democratic reforms” (Times on Line 03 November 
2005). The strong support of the British government to Meles Zenawi enraged anti-TPLF-EPRDF 
Ethiopian demonstrators in the 2005 post-election crises. According to the report of Times on Line 
(03 November 2005), some demonstrators in Addis Ababa shouted at a certain British journalist, 
‘Tell Blair to open his eyes’, ‘Tell your Government what is happening here,’” and “when the West going to realize 
this government is a bunch of morons?” The displeasure of Britain was very clear when it suspended £ 70 
of direct budget support to Ethiopia (Times on Line 13 February 2006). CNN (18 January 2006) 
also reported that Britain cut off all its aid to Ethiopia’s government and redirected the 70 million 
euro to humanitarian agencies functioning in Ethiopia. In fact, before announcing this decision, 
Hillary Benn, Britain’s International Development Secretary, had met Meles Zenawi and voiced 
Britain’s concern. Benn said, “Because of our concerns over the political situation I have told the (Ethiopian 
prime minister) that we can not provide direct budget support under the current circumstances” (CNN 18 January 
2006).  
As I have stated above, the way Meles Zenawi handled the election conflicts had deeply shocked 
Tony Blair. This deep anger of Tony Blair was visible when he met Meles Zenawi in the summit of 
“progressive” world leaders held in South Africa in February 2006. In his press briefing in the 
conference, Tony Blair told reporters that the Ethiopian government had overreacted: “This is not a 
question of a government stealing an election to try to hang on to power, it is the government reaction to the reaction to 
the result that we consider-if I may be undiplomatic – to be an overreaction” (Times on Line 13 February 2006). 
Describing the icy diplomatic atmosphere between Tony Blair and Meles Zenawi, Times on Line 
(13 February 2006) notes, “Whereas the other leaders’ chairs were placed in such a way that they almost rubbed 
shoulders, a large gap opened up behind the place names of the UK and Ethiopia.” Narrating exactly what 
happened between Tony Blair and Meles Zenawi at the end of the conference, Times on Line (13 
February 2006) reported, “Afterwards, Mr. Blair warmly shook the hands of Thabo Mebeki of South Africa 
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and Göran Persson from Sweden, hugged Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil and kissed Helen Clark from New 
Zealand. All contact with Mr. Meles, though, was avoided.”  
Many British newspapers had also criticized Meles Zenawi. For instance, The Telegraph (16 
December 2005) notes, “A leader handpicked by Tony Blair to champion Africa has smashed his opponents 
with the biggest crackdown in the continent’s recent history, jailing 40,000 people including boys of 15....A 
crackdown on this scale has not been seen in Africa for 20 years and the repression exceeds anything by President 
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe for the past decade at least. Apartheid-era South Africa’s onslaught against the black 
townships in the 1980s provides the only recent comparison.” On the other hand, Meles Zenawi protested 
Britain’s decision to withdraw the budgetary support to Ethiopia. Sarcastically he remarked that the 
British government was “entitled to do what it wanted with its ‘own and British tax payers’ money’” (Times 
on Line 13 February 2006). In one of his briefings to the local media, Meles Zenawi also 
announced that his government had the “capacity to run regular activities and main development programmers 
of the country through its own expenditure, should any serious measures be taken by development partners” (Reuters 
28 January 2006). 
51 However, from the start the EU was reluctant to take actions. For instance, the spokesman of the 
Commission, Amadeu Altafaj Tardio said, “The European Commission and other donors have doubts that 
the necessary conditions are in place to go ahead with budget support...What we’ve done is not suspend (making funds 
available), but delay taking a decision to go ahead with this budget support....Given the current instability....it doesn’t 
seem possible to go ahead” (Sudan Tribune 30 December 2005). 
52 Out of $1.2 billion development assistance Ethiopia received from donors in that year, the World 
Bank provided $450 million. In addition to the aforesaid development aid, the country received 
$700 million in emergency aid to fight against frequent droughts and food shortages (IOL 2005-11-
16). During the 2005 election crisis, the World Bank country director, Isaac Diwan, said “aid will be 
cut. The question is by how much? We have sent very clear signals that international and World Bank assistance will 
be cut over time if the governance situation does not improve.” However, the country Director expressed his 
worry that the aid cut might seriously affect the poor people in the country. Moreover, he noted 
that economic problems in the country would aggravate political crisis and this had worried the 
donor countries. According to him, “The economic fragility could exacerbate the current political crisis.....The 
risk is that social expenditure will be cut which will hurt the poor” (Independent Online 2005-11-16). 
53 Some people in the West have argued that perhaps some radical people in the ruling party were 
responsible for these repressive measures. For instance, Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa specialist at 
the University of London notes, “There are people with in Zenawi’s party and his security apparatus who do 
have a certain amount of discretion and a lot of these people grew up at war in the bush. They are more than likely 
behind this reaction to dissent”  (Pflanz 27 June 2005).  Despite this wrong assumption, it was Meles 
Zenawi himself who had put (on May 15, 2005) the command of the notorious Federal Police that 
massacred many demonstrators under his direct command (see BBC 16 May 2005; Sudan Tribune 
15 May 2005). According to some local critics, it is highly likely that the top leadership of the ruling 
party deliberately misinformed Western donor representatives in Addis Ababa by disseminating 
such wrong information in order to put the blame on the lower EPRDF officials and the Police. 
54 According to The Herald (04 November 2005), “Western diplomats fear Ethiopia might be more likely to 
go to war again with Eritrea, its old rival, as a way to rally domestic support.” 
55 For instance, although some Irish charity organizations such as GOAL requested the Irish 
government to cut off aid to Ethiopia due to the government’s poor human rights record, the Irish 
government rejected their call arguing that it chose very carefully where the money was spent. The 
charity organization, GOAL, according to its Chief executive, John O’Shea, wants a mechanism to 
channel aid through other means such as through non-governmental agencies rather than giving 
government-to-government support (Sudan Tribune 22 January 2006). He said, “We want to see the 
poor of Ethiopia benefit...We don’t want to see aid cut off but we want it channeled through other routes” (Sudan 
Tribune 22 January 2006).  
56 According to Cammack et al (2006), after 9/11 the Bush administration defined non-democratic, 
fragile and poorly-governed states as threats to national security of the USA. George Bush, in his 
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2005 inaugural address said, “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world….So it is the policy of 
the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and 
culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world“ (Steele and Scott 2005: 6-7).  
57 In reality, however, as Carothers (2007:8) rightly pointed out, “Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is an 
undemocratic strongman who manipulates elections and limits political freedom in a country many hoped would move 
forward on democracy during this decade.” 
58 Confident in his relationship with the Bush administration, and assuming that the US would 
downplay the democracy issue, Meles Zenawi took the bold step in the 2005 election of expelling 
three major U.S. democracy promotion organizations (Carothers 2007: 8). As Meles Zenawi hoped, 
the Bush administration regretted these moves but continued its close relationship with Ethiopia 
(Carothers 2007: 8). It is also interesting to note that the US support has encouraged Meles Zenawi 
to use anti-terrorism slogans to silence internal opponents. The Ethiopian government accused its 
opponents, particularly those political groups that have been waging armed struggle such as the 
OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) as terrorist 
organizations (see The Economist 3 April 2008; Sudan Tribune 29 May 2008; Les nouvelles d’Addis 
29 March 2006; VOA 04 April 2007; People’s Daily online 15 August 2007; MFAE 21 November 
2008; McGregor 5 June 2007; Samuel 28 September 2007;BBC 15 August 2007; McLure 22 January 
2008). Occasionally, the government has also been using terrorism label against the loyal 
oppositions such as the OFDM (Oromo Federal Democratic Movement) and the OPC (Oromo 
People’s Congress), in spite of the fact that both parties are legally-registered parties and have seats 
in the federal and regional parliaments (Ethioguardian 10 November 2008; Sudan Tribune 2 
December 2008; UNPO 27 November 2008). The newly established (foreign-based) G-7 party is 
also categorized as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government (BBC 6 May 2009; Reuters 
5 May 2009; VOA 02 May 2009, 06 May 2009).  
59 According to Brown (2005: 188), Western donors and international financial institutions tend to 
overlook Ethiopia’s democratic regression due to Meles Zenawi’s lip service for free market, and 
his role as a self-appointed stabilizing force in the war torn Horn of Africa. Price (2009: 161) notes 
that in countries “such as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, short-term calculations of self-interest have muted U.S. 
advocacy for democratic reform.” For Young (2004: 20), the Ethiopian government also played a card 
including opposing ‘expansionist Islam’ and counterbalancing the Sudanese regime. When that card 
became obsolete, Meles Zenawi drew another card i.e. the guarantor of peace in Somalia.  
60 One of the State Department officials who were very angry on Meles Zenawi’s government was 
Herman Cohen, Under Secretary of State of Africa from 1989 to 1993 (i.e. in George Bush senior’s 
administration). Cohen requested the US president (Bush junior) to suspend aid to Ethiopia (The 
African Monitor 30 August 2005) due to the government’s bad human rights records. 
61 For the first time in the history of Ethiopia, Ethiopian troops crossed their border and occupied a 
territory of a neighboring county. Initially, the US did not fully approve Ethiopia’s intervention in 
Somalia and General John Abizaid, Chief of US military operations in Iraq had warned Meles 
Zenawi that an invasion would be disastrous and Somalia would be Ethiopia’s Iraq (BBC 1 January 
2009). Despite its initial objection, the US had “provided intelligence, military targeting and logistic 
support to Ethiopian forces in Somalia” (BBC 1 January 2009). Though the Ethiopian government 
argued otherwise, Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia was disastrous. Its intervention was very costly 
economically, politically, and militarily. For long, Meles Zenawi was consistently rejecting the 
criticisms from the Ethiopian Opposition MPs and the international media. He had been telling the 
Ethiopian parliament that his troops’ intervention in Somalia did not affect his country’s economy 
(Newsweek 10 April 2008), and the death toll of Ethiopia’s troops was insignificant (see Newsweek 
10 April 2008). In January 2009, however, military reverses, high death toll of Ethiopian soldiers, 
economic constraints (Financial Times 27 August 2008), and the changing international situations, 
particularly the reduction of support from the US forced him to withdraw Ethiopian troops from 
Somalia (Sudan Tribune 25 June 2009). Much later, he reluctantly admitted the economic impacts 
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of the war on Ethiopia (see Financial Times 27 August 2008), but adamantly refused to give answer 
on the exact number of Ethiopian deaths in Somalia (see Newsweek 10 April 2008). In one of his 
parliament speeches, he told the Ethiopian MPs that he had no obligation to give answer to the 
parliament regarding Ethiopia’s causalities and bluntly declared that the issue was not useful to the 
parliament (Capital March 2009; The Reporter 22 March 2009a). Ironically, according to Article 
72(2) of the Constitution, the Prime Minister is accountable to the parliament: “The Prime Minister 
and the Council of Ministers are responsible to the House of Peoples’ Representatives”, it says. 
Moreover, according to Article 50(3) of the Constitution, the supreme body in the country is the 
parliament. It says: ”The House of Peoples’ Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government.” 
62 As BBC (1 January 2009) reported, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia in January 2009 
without having broken the power of Somalia’s Islamists. Ethiopia’s invasion radicalized the Somalis 
and increased the number of al-Shabaab fighters that replaced the once-powerful militia of the 
Islamic Courts. 
63 In the interview with the New Internationalist (March 2004), he said Ethiopia is a country “that 
had no inflation, high growth, a government committed to helping the 85 percent of the population in the rural sector 
and to cutting back on military expenditure even though it had come into power by the gun-really quite striking.”  
Four or five years after Stiglitz’ testimony, however, Ethiopia found itself in the worst inflation in 
the country’s history. According to APA (2009-03-12), the inflation of food prices in December 
2008 was 96% and in January-February 2009 it reached 104.1%. 
64 Contrary to Joseph Stigliz’s claim, perhaps the most corrupt government in the history of 
Ethiopia is the government of Meles Zenawi (see Negussay 12 October 2001; Tecola 28 July 2005, 
18 June 2009; Wachter 14 February 2007). As Gorfu (29 May 2009), a staunch supporter of the 
ruling party, reluctantly admitted in Ethiopia, “Corruption has now become rampant and almost a norm in 
many levels of government”. Moreover, despite the involvement of many high government and ruling 
party officials, only few of them such as the former Prime Minister, Tamirat Layne (see The 
Independent 4 February 2000; BBC 14 May 2003), and Seeye Abrha, former defense minister (BBC 
30 May 2001; ION 23-06-2001; People’s Daily online 24 July 2001) were sacked and prosecuted. 
According to Tesfaye (2001EC: 182-194, 226), Meles Zenawi used corruption charges only to 
remove his political opponents. Tesfaye (Ibid) argued that despite the involvement of many other 
high level government officials in the corruption, Meles Zenawi decided to take actions only against 
his political rivals. 
65 On the other hand, however, as Tecola Hagos (4 June 2009), the one time legal advisor of Meles 
Zenawi admitted, “The major public works, such as highways, dams, college and school buildings, airports and 
runways et cetera are schemes to move public money from the Ethiopian treasury to the private purses of companies 
controlled by Meles Zenawi and his group, who become contractors, sub contractors and suppliers to all such projects.” 
66 In his congratulatory speech, Yara’s president Thorleif Enger appreciated Meles Zenawi. He said, 
“The prize is recognition of past accomplishments and encouragement to achieve economic development for the people of 
Ethiopia. History will prove if the winner is a worthy recipient. We are willing to take that chance.” Jeffrey Sachs 
also gave a similar remark during the occasion. “It is richly deserved as Ethiopia has given much to the 
World and deserves our support. Like many African nations, it is at a precarious crossroads we have to help them 
choose the right path. With our support Ethiopia can lift itself from poverty and hunger. Under Prime Minister Meles 
the country has created the grass roots structure to enable this to happen.” 
(see “First Yara Prize awarded to Meles Zenawi.”<http:// Yara.com> ) 
Ironically, the Yara prize was awarded to Meles Zenawi just two months after his party rigged the 
election and his troops massacred many anti-government demonstrators in the June 2005 crisis. 
Exactly two months after he received the Yara prize, his troops once again massacred many pro-
Opposition demonstrators in the November 2005 post-election riot (see Negussay 2 September 
2005).  
67 It is interesting to note that one month earlier (i.e. on 23 March 2009) Dr. Gregory Stanton, 
President of Genocide Watch, submitted a proposal to the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Justice Navanathem Pillay, requesting the initiation of an investigation on Meles Zenawi on 
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his alleged role on the genocidal massacre of the Anuak people in Gambella and the Amhara 
people in various areas (see Genocide Watch 23 March 2009; VOA 15 April 2009). Moreover, the 
Amnesty international and the Human Rights Watch had accused Meles Zenawi’s government of 
genocide against ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and war crimes in the 
neighbouring country, Somalia (The Economist 5 February 2009). The European Union had also 
declared its intention to investigate the alleged war crimes committed by Meles Zenawi’s 
government in Somalia (Reuters 6 April 2007).  
Dismayed by Meles Zenawi’s participation in the G-20 meeting many Diaspora Ethiopians and 
various political groups used the opportunity to oppose Meles Zenawi’s anti-democratic practices. 
The supporters of various political organizations including the TPLF’s former allies namely, the 
OLF and the ONLF held demonstrations in London and denounced his government. Perhaps 
embarrassed by the demonstrations, Meles Zenawi abruptly cancelled his press briefing at the end 
of the conference. According to Henry Gombya of The Black Star News (2 April 2009), Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi decided to abruptly cancel his press conference at the G-20 meeting to 
avoid questions on human rights in Ethiopia and his unsuccessful intervention in Somalia. 
68 Moreover, the incumbent party controls many multi-billion business organizations under the 
umbrella corporation called EFFORT (Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray). 
According to Shinn and Ofcansky (2004), the EFFORT was established in August 1995 as an 
umbrella organization for companies operated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and 
operates as a public endowment. The main companies include Addis Pharmaceuticals, Guna 
Trading Company, Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization, Mega Advertising Enterprise, Radio Fana, 
Trans-Ethiopia Company etc. The top officials of the EFFORT are prominent government 
officials and TPLF party executives such as Seyoum Mesfin (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and 
Sebhat Nega (Shinn and Ofcansky 2004: 137). For Prendergast and Duffield (1998: 46), the 
EFFORT is a:“Non-government-owned enterprises controlled through majority shareholding by members of the 
TPLF and to a lesser extent by other EPRDF-affiliated parties, particularly the OPDO and the Amhara 
National Democratic Movement (ANDM)………. EFFORT obtained large blocks of shares in numerous key 
companies formed by leading by TPLF members. Profits end up under the control of the EPRDF members. These 
companies represent what is likely the largest concentration of capital and assets within Ethiopia.” Recently, Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi has appointed his wife to be in charge of this business empire (Tecola 4 
June 2009; Addis Fortune 03-30-2009). 
69 Similarly, the prime minister vowed to spread internet services to the entire country in three years  
time (AP 04-05-05). “We plan to ensure universal access and internet connectivity to all the tens of thousands of 
rural kebels (districts) of our country over the next two to three years”, he said. According to the plan, by 2007 
all Ethiopians would live not more than a few kilometres from broadband access point (The 
Guardian 14 August 2005). At present, however, internet development in Ethiopia is the lowest in 
Africa. According to ITU (2009: 91), the proportion of households with Internet in Ethiopia is 
0.1%; mobile cellular subscription per 1000 inhabitants is 1.5; fixed telephone with computer is 0.2. 
Moreover, Internet user per 100 inhabitants is 0.4 (ITU 2009: 93). 
70 To be honest, China is not the first country to use aid as a tool to advance its national interests 
abroad (Naim 2007). As I have already discussed, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the 
United States were giving economic aid to dictators in exchange for their loyalty.  
71 It is ironic that Ethiopia itself has in its Constitution an article (no.39) that gives its states 
(regions) the right to secession. 
72 Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (2005-03-22): “African Countries Supporting China on the 
Adoption of the Anti-Secession Law“ http://www.focac.org/eng/zt/asl/t188411.htm, (Accessed 
16.06.2009). 
73 The Ethiopian government has been using this Chinese technology to tap telephones, block the 
Websites of opposition parties, independent media, and human rights organizations (see CPJ 29 
August 2008; EMF 15 May 2009; Reuters 01 May 2007; RSF 29 May 2006; 23-05-2006; VOA 24 
May 2006; US Department of State 25 February 2009). 
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74 Recently, however, the UN has decided to prosecute the Sudanese leader for his possible 
involvement in the genocide (The New York Times 5 March 2009). According to The New York 
Times (5 March 2009), and Las Vegas Sun (5 March 2009), the other considered possible targets of 
the Court in Africa are the leaders of Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Ivory 
Coast, Rwanda and Central African Republic.  
75 In Ethiopia, for instance, as testified by many Western media, due to the Chinese support there 
are visible signs of infrastructural development in the country compared to the country’s situation 
in the previous regimes. However, despite this “progress” Ethiopians have found themselves in the 
worst form of poverty in the country’s history. 
76 Some Western scholars have wrongly credited Meles Zenawi for averting the danger of Ethiopia’s 
disintegration in 1991. For instance, Cedric Barnes, Horn of Africa specialist at the University of 
London, claims, “While there are problems with Ethiopia’s human rights record, and cronyism which means 
economic benefits don’t always go to everyone, Zenawi deserves credit for holding the whole thing together and making 
at least some progress” (Pflanz 27 June 2005). On the other hand, many scholars argue that it is the 
policy of Meles Zenawi, particularly his policy of ethnic federalism that encouraged secession and 
put the country in a very dangerous situation (see Wondwosen and Zahorik 2008: 1-39). As a 
secessionist rebel front since 1970s (see TPLF’s 1976 Manifesto and Aregawi 2004: 591), it was the 
TPLF that fought against the unity forces in the country such as the EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Party), EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) and the central Ethiopian government. 
The original plan of the TPLF was to separate Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia by allying itself with 
another secessionist force in Eritrea, EPLF. However, the rapid and unexpected fall of the central 
Ethiopian government in 1991 following the collapse of the Socialist system at the end of the Cold 
War, and the realization that Tigray has been one of the poorest regions in Ethiopia forced the 
TPLF to temporarily defer its plan of secession. 
There is a widespread belief in Ethiopia that the TPLF, which became a ruling party in 1991, 
decided to rule the country until it strengthens the Tigray region economically and militarily. 
Moreover, in order to weaken the pro-unity forces in the country, the TPLF-EPRDF government 
forcefully divided the country along ethnic lines and included Article 39 (in the constitution) that 
allows the newly structured regions (States) the right to secession. Contrary to the assumption of 
the Western scholars, the TPLF government, which is dominated by ethnic Tigreans (Wrong 14 
November 2005; McLure 22 June 2009; Howden 28 June 2009), has never believed in the 
Ethiopian unity, and its ultimate goal is the creation of an independent Tigray. However, due to 
various protracted factors TPLF is still not in a position to secede Tigray. Despite ruling the whole 
of Ethiopia for the last 20 years, still the ruling TPLF party is unable to implement its original plan 
of secession. The first obstacle for the secession of Tigray at present is the conflict between the 
TPLF and EPLF. The former alliance between the TPLF and the EPLF broke down due to their 
economic, border and personal conflicts and the two former comrade-in-arms fought a bloody war 
in 1998-2000. Therefore, the TPLF leadership realized that as long as the current Eritrean regime 
led by Isaias Afeworki is in power, it is highly unlikely that Eritrea would support the creation of an 
independent Trgray. (In his interview held in Asmara in June 2009 with Elias Kifle, the editor of 
The Ethiopian Review, Isaias Afeworki, the Eritrean President, ridiculed the prospect of the 
secession of Tigray, and the ethnic federalism policy of the TPLF). The second factor is the gradual 
diminishing interest of the ethnic Tigreans for secession. At present, the secession of Tigray is no 
more the priority for many TPLF members, unlike the 1970s where secession was the top agenda 
of the party. This shift was caused by various reasons. Currently, many of the TPLF combatants 
have become top federal government officials and the ethnic Tigreans have controlled most of the 
country’s economic and political resources in spite of the fact that ethnic Tigreans represent only 
6% of the total Ethiopian population (McLure 22 June 2009). Therefore, these days, most of the 
ethnic Tigreans want the status quo, and are not ready for secession. Furthermore, many 
secessionist organizations including the TPLF and OLF have realized that contrary to their 
expectation, secession by itself does not bring a magical solution to their economic and political 
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problems. The realization of the economic problems of the newly-independent Eritrea has given 
them a lesson that breaking away from the rest of Ethiopia would aggravate their economic woes. 
It is also interesting to note that almost all secessionist parties including the OLF and TPLF are 
losing ground and support not only in the rest of Ethiopia but also in their own particular regions. 
For many ethnic Tigreans, the TPLF died a political death in 2001 when the Meles-led group 
expelled the party’s former prominent leaders such as Seeye Abraha, Gebru Asrat, Tewolde 
Woldemariam, Alemseged Gebreamlak and others. Moreover, the mysterious assassinations of the 
party’s charismatic leaders like Hailom Araya and Kinfe Gebremedhin, to a certain extent, have 
weakened the blind loyalty of many Tigrean to the TPLF. At present, former high ranking TPLF 
officials such as Gebru Asrat and Aregash Adane have joined pro-unity opposition forces in the 
country. 
77 Since 1991, many top officials of the ruling party have been repeatedly threatening that if 
attempts are made to change the current constitution, the TPLF would re-start its guerrilla war in 
the country. In his interview in the Ethiopian Forum for Political Civility (Ethio-Civility Pal Talk) 
on 28 May 2007, Sebhat Nega, one of the architects of the ruling TPLF party and the so-called 
“Father of Tigray”, openly declared that Ethiopia would disintegrate if the opposition parties 
attempted to change the existing constitution. (In this case, by implication, it means that even if 
opposition parties win election constitutionally, they will not have any right to change or modify the 
TPLF authored constitution). It is interesting to note that in their political program most of the 
legally- registered non-ethnic parties such as the AEUP have declared that they would change some 
articles such as Article 39 from the Constitution if they were elected. It is a foregone conclusion 
that the ruling party would use the Tigrean-dominated army and the Police against the people in 
case of election defeats as witnessed in the 2005 election. In this kind of situation, it is not 
surprising if local critics question the significance of having election every five years! 
78 Meles Zenawi argues that Ethiopia was created by force and the various ethnic groups were 
forced to be parts of Ethiopia by the former “Amhara ruling class” (The New York Times 29 May 
1991). According to him, the inclusion of Article 39 in the constitution gives the various 
“nationalities, nations and peoples” in the country the guarantee that whenever they felt their rights 
and freedom are violated, they could secede from the federation by invoking the said article. (To 
understand why Zenawi’s government imposed ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, see Wondwosen and 
Záhořík 2008). 
79 It is interesting to note that not to antagonize the ruling TPLF-EPRDF party the embassies of 
the Western donors in Addis Ababa have been reluctant to have consultations with the pan-
Ethiopian and non-ethnic parties. One of the pan-Ethiopian parties that became the victim of such 
policy is the AEUP (All-Ethiopian Union Party) whose leader, Hailu Shawel, is wrongly being 
portrayed as an Amhara hard liner. Many times, the diplomats and other government officials of 
Western donors fail to include the AEUP in their discussions with Ethiopian opposition parties in 
spite of the fact that the party is the largest and the most influential opposition party in the country 
(KAEUP 26 March 2009; VEDR 6 December 2008). Recently, however, due to the intensive 
lobbying efforts of the AEUP Diaspora support groups in the United States and to quash the wild 
speculations on the issue, the US embassy political advisor in Addis Ababa held a discussion with 
the AEUP’s chairman (AEUP 20 February 2009), which soon sparked a controversy forcing the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to release a scathing remark against the US in its weekly press 
release (see The Reporter 11 March 2009; EMFA 6-3-2009).  
80 The donors’ attitude towards the Opposition is largely influenced by the ruling party, which has 
sufficient experience in defaming or undermining the opposition parties, particularly the pan-
Ethiopian political groups. As I have mentioned earlier, prior to the 2005 election, the donors were 
reluctant to have consultations with the opposition groups and as the result they did not have clear 
and sufficient information concerning their economic and political programs. For instance, the 
German specialists working in various projects in Ethiopia were worried due to the electoral defeats 
of Arkebe Equbai and other candidates of the ruling party in the Addis Ababa city government, 
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which was closely collaborating with GTZ. According to the German-Foreign-Policy.Com (2005-
05-18), the regional manager of the German state-owned GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit") (“Association for technical cooperation") said, “It is difficult to judge the economic 
intentions of the opposition, who, in some areas won ‘landslide victories’ because of ‘insufficient previous observation’”.  
81 According to Wondwosen (2008a: 780-809), the government’s policy of ethnic federalism has 
created an ample situation for the establishment of ethnic-based parties at the expense of the pan-
Ethiopian and non-ethnic parties.  
82 The TPLF-EPRDF government has been attempting to weaken the opposition parties 
(particularly non-ethnic or pan-Ethiopian parties) in various ways. These include: by encouraging 
dissent among their ranks; by harassing, intimidating and imprisoning their leaders and members 
etc. Moreover, by manipulating the courts and the NEBE (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia) 
the ruling party gives a legal cover to its actions (see Wondwosen 2009d: 60-68). 
83 Many non-ethnic parties such as the EPRP, which have been strong rivals of the TPLF since the 
1970s, and other unity parties such as MEISON are excluded from the country’s political scene by 
the ruling party (Merera 2003: 87-88, 161) in order to frustrate their mobilizing capacity. The 
principal precondition to participate in the Ethiopian political scene, according to the TPLF-
EPRDF, is renouncing armed struggle, accepting the constitution, and stopping any attempt to 
remove the government by force (Wondwosen 2008a: 780-809). 
84 According to Berhanu (1998EC:385-386) and Gebru Asrat (20 September 2008), the incumbent 
party was defeated in the 2005 election. However, it was declared “winner” by rigging the election 
(Newsweek 20 April 2009). 
85 There are two major misconceptions regarding the CUD. As reported by the BBC (23 July 2007), 
there is an assumption that the CUD’s major supporters in the 2005 election were the Amhara 
people. Though it is true that the CUD got important electoral victories in the Amhara region, its 
strong base was Addis Ababa, the capital city, whose residents are ethnically diverse. In Addis 
Ababa, the CUD got almost 100 % electoral victory. Secondly, as pointed out by Abbink (2006: 
173-179), it was wrongly assumed that the CUD was largely supported by the so-called “chauvinist” 
Amhara elements. In reality, however, CUD’s support came from various population groups and 
regions, particularly from Addis Ababa, SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
Region), and Amhara region. 
86 Many people in Ethiopia believe that the courts are kangaroo courts, filled by puppet judges who 
graduated from the EPRDF-controlled Civil Service College (see The Reporter 17 June 2009). In 
the last 19 years, the country has witnessed a spate of political show trials staged against opposition 
leaders, civil society leaders, and journalists of the independent media. 
87 In the present-day Ethiopia, as clearly observed in the 2005 post-election crises, “genocide” and 
“treason “charges against opposition parties, civil society leaders, and journalists of the independent 
media have become the major tools of the government to smash dissident voices (see BBC 9 April 
2007, 17 December 2005; VOA 22 March 2006; Reuters 9 April 2007; People’s Daily online 17 
December 2007; The Independent 3 May 2006). 
88 During a negotiation to end the 2005 post-election crises, Meles Zenawi explicitly told the 
Opposition leaders that if they expect to run the country they should follow his guerrilla route and 
go in to the bush (see Wrong 14 November 2005). (Ironically, Meles passed his message in the 
presence of the then EU Commission representative, Timothy Clarke, who facilitated the 
discussion between the Prime Minister and the leaders of the two largest Opposition coalitions, Dr. 
Berhanu Nega and Prof. Beyene Petros (see Berhanu 1998EC:435-436). Prime Minister Meles 
Zenawi also told Timothy Clarke that if Western donors oppose his government’s actions against 
the Opposition, “They can leave the country with their money” (see Berhanu 1998EC: 435-436). 
89 The Ethiopian government strongly criticized the aid-cut plan of the donor countries after the 
2005 electoral conflicts. For instance, Sufyan Ahmed, the country’s Finance Minister, objected the 
aid-cut plan on the ground that it would affect the country’s poor. Pointing out that the direct 
budgetary support would make up around 10% of Ethiopia’s budget, he said, “The impact should be 
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insignificant although it is the poor who will be affected.” He also accused the donors of misunderstanding 
the real problems in the country: “Either they have misunderstood what is going on in the country or they are 
under pressure from certain groups-I don’t know.....We feel this is an unacceptable decision, but it is their prerogative” 
(IRIN 30 December 2005). 
90 Diamond (1997: 32) criticized the hypocrisy of Western donors as follows: “For Africa, a lower 
standard is set by the major Western powers: opposition parties that can contest for office, even if they are to be 
manipulated, hounded, and blatantly rigged into defeat at election time.“ 
91 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the only countries that are moving to a clear form of consolidated 
democracy are South Africa, Botswana and Mauritis (Rakner and Menocal 2007: 17). According to 
some researchers, other African countries such as Tanzania (Lawson and Rakner 2005; Kelsall 
2003), Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Lindberg 2003), and Mozambique (Manning 2005) should be 
put in the category of consolidating democracies though the findings of the authors are being 
challenged.  
Freedom House democracy indices (Siegle 2007: 3) categorized African political regimes in 2007 in 
four groups: Consolidating democracies, democratizers, semi-authoritarians, and autocracies.  
Consolidating Democracies are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, and South Africa. 
Democratizers are Burundi, Comoros, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
Semi-Authoritarians are Angola, Burkina Faso, Burkina Faso, Central African Rep, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Togo  
Autocracies are Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. 
92 In fact, since the second half of the 1990s as Harbeson (1999: 52-53) claimed, Ethiopia has 
become a ‘de facto single-party’ state. Moreover, according to The Independent (10 June 2005), 
“The prime minister, Meles Zenawi, appeared to lean to the West, but has failed to deliver either democracy or stable 
and growing economy. The government’s panicked response to opposition protests in the wake of the election is 
reminiscent of recent developments in Central Asia.”  
93 Emboldened by the Western donors’ support in the 2005 post-election crises, the EPRDF 
government recently introduced new repressive proclamations to fully control the independent 
media (Wondwosen 2009b: 84-112), and civil society organizations (Wondwosen 2009a: 80-95). 
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